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Abstract
The revival of ethnicity and preservation and development of
ethnic neighborhoods are key issues in America today. This
thesis, which has focused on Italian-Americans and their
neighborhoods, has attempted to provide an understanding of
the historical evolution of these neighborhoods by synthe-
sizing the structural changes undergone there and by eluci-
dating the dialectical relationship between these changes
and the assimilation process of Italian-Americans. Such a
historical analysis has raised certain issues, such as assimi-
lation versus cultural pluralism, ethnic versus class stra-
tification, and manipulative intermediaries versus community
leaders, which, I feel, are central to an analysis of ethni-
city and ethnic groups and which must be among the concerns
of future ethnic neighborhood preservation and development
attempts.
This thesis also evaluates the aims and effects of the gov-
ernment agencies' policies for and planning processes in
ethnic neighborhoods during the past few years. In particu-
lar, my analysis of the "Risorgimento Plan" for Little Italy
in New York reveals the limitations of present ethnic neigh-
borhood preservation and provides suggestions for alternate
action.
Thesis Supervisor: Tunney F. Lee
Title: Associate Professor
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7INTRODUCTION
Why it is important, today, to speculate on the preservation
and development of ethnic neighborhoods.
Many ethnic neighborhoods in inner city districts are
in the process of undergoing major structural (physical and
social) changes. There are forces acting on these neighbor-
hoods which aim at altering the social content of the areas
and at profiting from real estate operation. These process-
es are facilitated by the disintegrating social cohesion of
most ethnic neighborhoods and often by the lack of appropri-
ate community leadership. Governmental efforts to regulate
such phenomena have been mostly ineffective. It is there-
fore important to study thoroughly the problems of ethnic
neighborhoods, to understand the reasons for the government's
failure in dealing with these problems and, if possible, to
provide alternative proposals for action.
The current economic crisis has dramatized and acceler-
ated physical and social changes occuring in ethnic neigh-
borhoods. The construction of new housing has almost been
brought to a halt. The cost of suburban housing, which was
8already increasing because of higher taxes, has consequently
been affected. As a result, many young people, professionals,
and other potential investors have been attracted to certain
inner city districts, mainly historical ones, which are often
inhabited by ethnic groups. The relatively low rent levels
and the safety and pleasantness of these areas have been rea-
sons for such an attraction. This phenomenon has also en-
couraged real estate exploitation and has created conflicts
between newcomers and old residents, the latter fearing an
eventual displacement and meanwhile having to bear the burden
of such side effects as higher rents and taxes.
The effects of such processes can already be seen in
large cities such as New York and Boston and even in smaller
ones such as Providence and Worcester. In New York, pressure
exercised by real estate groups on old districts such as the
brownstone areas of Brooklyn and the Lower East and West
Sides of Manhattan has resulted in conflicts among communities,
government agencies, and newcomers. In Boston, the North End
is treatened by pressure resulting from the surrounding ur-
ban renewal development.
The ethnic communities living in inner city districts are
particularly sensitive to and affected by the above mentioned
phenomena. For example, the influx of the new population in-
to the neighborhood contributes to the disintegration of the
already weakened community cohesiveness. Also, changes in
ownership of many of the neighborhood estates result in the
9community's loss of control of its "turf." Such situations,
in addition to the above mentioned economic burden affecting
the old residents of ethnic neighborhoods, have produced cries
of protest and screams for survival.
Responding to community and real estate group pressure,
city and federal agencies stepped in to regulate the physical
development of the neighborhoods and to preserve, whenever
possible, the existing communities. There is however evidence
that their efforts have mostly been ineffective. The ineffec-
tiveness of these agencies is, in my opinion, due to their lack
of an historical understanding of the complex and interrelated
socio-economic and political events which have shaped and con-
ditioned the existence of ethnic neighborhoods in large Amer-
ican cities. The agencies also seem to be unable or do not
want to surface appropriate leadership in the neighborhoods
and often tend to serve only specific interest groups while
forgetting the needs of the underrepresented majority of the
residents. Finally the ineffectiveness of the agencies is
conditioned by the neighborhood residents' lack of awareness
of their past and present social conditions and lack of vi-
sion or confusion regarding the future of their community.
The current interest in ethnic neighborhoods has also
been steered by a movement called the New Ethnicity which,
during the past few years, has attained national dimensions.
Many leaders of this movement, who in the past lobbied for
the Ethnic Heritage Studies Act, are now very concerned with
10
urban issues affecting their ethnic groups and constituencies.
They are therefore now supporting the National Neighborhood
Policy Act which is still pending in Congress. While this
legislation, if enacted, should make available new economic
resources to needy communities, it is essential that a new
leadership emerge from such communities in order to over-
come other factors that have prevented or limited the effec-
tiveness of governmental agencies.
A new leadership is needed that will be able to arouse
the consciousness of the ethnic and other residents, build
in them an awareness of the marginality of their socio-eco-
nomic conditions, convince them that they can control the de-
velopment of their living environment and improve their so-
cial conditions if they succeed in defining and articulating
their needs and desires and in defending their rights in the
political arena. A leadership which in the political arena
does not only compete for the limited resources available to
their constituencies, but forms meaningful coalitions to in-
crease the resources available.
Aim of Thesis
Basically, in this thesis, I wish to understand the com-
plexity of problems affecting ethnic neighborhoods; to point
out what has caused the ineffectiveness of government agen-
cies which have dealt with them; to explore possible action
which could be proposed to overcome such ineffectiveness; and
11
to articulate what role new leaders could/should olay in the
process of preservation and development of ethnic neighbor-
hoods.
For the purpose of this thesis I have decided to study
the Italian-American neighborhoods located in inner city
districts. I shall focus on the Little Italies of New York
and of Boston. I have chosen these communities as case
studies for various reasons. First of all, because they are
among the oldest and most famous ethnic communities still
existing in America and because they are now undergoing trans-
formation. Secondly, because governmental agencies have pro-
posed or are proposing plans for their preservation and de-
velopment. Thirdly, because there exists extensive documen-
tation and historical data on these neighborhoods. Finally,
it was my own Italian background which had a determining in-
fluence on my choice of these communities.
In this thesis I shall specifically attempt to:
1. Provide Italian-American communities
with an understanding of the histor-
ical evolution of their neighborhoods
by synthesizing the- structural changes
undergone there and by elucidating the
dialectical relationship between these
changes and the assimilation process of
Italian-Americans.
2. Evaluate the aims and effects of the
12
government agencies' policies for and
planning processes in ethnic neighbor-
hoods during the last few years.
3. Suggest alternative processes which
will attempt to overcome the existing
limitations of ethnic neighborhood
preservation and development policies.
4. Propose new action to enhance the
participation of ethnic communities
in the planning processes that affect
them.
Thesis Structure
This thesis has been divided into six chapters which
respectively treat:
1. The cultural background of Italian-
Americans: relevance of native cul-
tural traits in the process of assim-
ilation of Italian immigrants; cul-
tural traits of Italian immigrants;
causes and modalities of mass emigra-
tion from Italy to the U.S.A.
2. The evolution of Italian-American
neighborhoods -- part I: reasons for
and implications of mass immigration
into the U.S.A. -- 1880; patterns of
13
settlement, regional and urban, of
Italian immigrants; the Italian Col-
onies 1880-1920 (external influences,
internal structure, evolution of in-
stitutions, community control and
leadership); the problem of assimila-
tion and Americanization; political and
cultural intolerance.
3. The evolution of Italian-American neigh-
borhoods -- part II: suburbanization and
insulation of Italian colonies; evolu-
tion of Italian-American neighborhoods
1920-1945 (the new social order, immigrant
culture, supporting institutions, commun-
ity control and leadership).
4. The evolution of Italian-American neigh-
borhoods -- part III: decline of neigh-
borhoods from 1945 - present (erosion of
community cohesion, decay of physical
structures, effects of urban renewal
programs); the present problems of the
Little Italies in New York and Boston;
rise of the "New Ethnicity" and the neigh-
borhood preservation crusades.
5. Evaluation of programs and planning pro-
cesses for the preservation of Italian-
14
American neighborhoods in NYC: two
cases -- the Italian-American Center
for Urban Affairs; the "Risorgimento"
Plan, a joint proposal by the NYC
Planning Commission and the Little
Italy Restoration Association.
6. Synthesis of problems and issues: as-
similation vs. cultural pluralism;
ethnic vs. class stratification; mani-
pulative intermediaries vs. community
leaders.
Most of the data and information given and discussed in
this thesis were gathered during my internship at the New York
Planning Commission (summer 1975) and through my course work
at M.I.T. (spring 1976). Discussions with and feedback from
the staffs of the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs in
Washington, D.C.; the Center for Migration Studies in New
York; and the Institute on Pluralism and Group Identity in
New York have provided me with a clearer focus on the issues.
Field work in the communities of Mulberry Street in New York
and the North End in Boston has given me a vital understanding
of the perceptions and feelings of "unmeltable ethnics."
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CHAPTER ONE
THE CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF ITALIAN-AMERICANS
"At the head of everything is God, Lord of Heaven.
After Him comes Prince Torlonia, lord of the earth.
Then come Prince Torlonia's armed guards.
Then come Prince Torlonia's armed guards' dogs.
Then, nothing at all. Then nothing at all. Then nothing
at all. Then come the peasants. And that's all."
(Ignazio Silone, Fontamara)
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The need to define and enforce a national character is
often one of the major tasks for the ruling class of a coun-
try. This already problematic task is even more difficult in
a country John F. Kennedy called a "nation of immigrants,"
where the advocacy of cultural pluralism should operate as a
counterforce against the enforcement of national homogeneity.
Most of the history of America can be read as the struggle
between forces of homogenization and counterforces of diversi-
fication. The issues at stake in this dialectic process are
evidently the maintenance of social control and the perpetu-
ation of a certain order that implies social inequalities
which are visible in the political, economic, and environ-
mental domains.
The process of enforcing a national character becomes
one of incorporation: a process which, originally in histor-
ical and sociological jargon and now in our everyday usage,
has euphemistically been called assimilation and which is
nothing but a process of domination or oppression by one
group over others. For incorporation or assimilation is a
prescriptive act necessitating the imposition of certain
values and standards of behavior by a ruling group on another
group which is forced to discard many of its own values and
traditions. Assimilation is thus, in my opinion, an oppres-
sive process since the ruling group of the host society de-
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cides that their ideology and way of life is superior and
should be assumed by all. This stance of superiority serves,
more importantly, as justification for their socio-economic
status and control.
Nevertheless, at first glance, one could argue that as-
similation, notwithstanding a dictation of values and behav-
ioral norms, can be considered a positive process if it
eventually permits individuals to be socially and economically
integrated in a given society. It is my contention, however,
that this is a superficial apprehension of the phenomenon and
that the possibility and reality of assimilation served addi-
tional oppressive functions in American society. At the time
of mass immigration, the belief in America as a land of oppor-
tunity where newcomers could be assimilated into the mainstream
and eventually "make it" had to be advocated if any immigrants
were to come here as cheap labor.
Oppression, however, was often viewed as temporary: if
the first generation immigrant remained an exploited outsider,
there was usually the hope and consolation that successive gener-
ations would be assimilated and achieve a higher socio-economic
status. Assimilation became intricately linked to the phenom-
enon of social mobility. Advocacy of the American way of life,
rising and making it as individuals, served not only to justify
a hierarchical and class structured capitalist society (every-
body eventually makes it!) but also to prevent potential re-
bellions of discontent ethnic groups or separatism -- attempts
18
to upset the ruling class structure and dominant ideology.
Assimilation and social mobility encouraged competition not
coalition, emphasized the de-rooted mobile individual not
group ties and obligations. You were taught to despise your
ethnic identity and group ties; you were ridiculed for your
differences. On one side, you saw a group struggling to sur-
vive and demeaned, on the other, people who were financially
comfortable and respected. You forgot or were unaware that
your cultural traits were the result of your inferior socio-
economic status and this was the issue around which to organ-
ize as a group and fight; instead you though it was your na-
tionality that was inferior so you set out to reject it and
become assimilated with the "beautiful people."
Individual assimilation was far from being an easy pro-
cess or equal for all. The ruling class certainly had no
intention of being deposed! If immigrants were led to believe
that if they became culturally assimilated they would eventu-
ally become socio-economically assimilated, the assimilation
process had to be such that it only posed a very remote threat
to the status and power of the ruling class. For those immi-
grants unwilling or unable to assimilate, the price was high:
emargination and penalization (as we shall see later). Yet,
for those who were willing or able to assimilate, the price
was equally high: forfeiting an identity and lifestyle for
new ones dictated by the ruling class and culture.
This painful process of cultural assimilation was only
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the beginning, however, of a much longer and more difficult
process of assimilation: socio-economic integration. Achiev-
ing economic opportunities, social acceptance, and a role in
the American power structure and decision-making process took
much longer to achieve than learning to speak English without
an accent and appearing "all-American." For some ethnic
groups, the former, even today, still remains an unmaterial-
ized dream. This is due to an unequal assimilation rate
among the different ethnic groups. I feel that assimilation
is greatly a function of the type and strength of the immi-
grants' native cultural traits. Those whose native language
was already English and whose cultural traits were close to
or compatible with those advocated by the host society could
most likely look forward to an easier assimilation process.
Therefore, to understand the dynamics of assimilation and
the acceptance or rejection of ethnic groups in American so-
ciety, we must first familiarize ourselves with the cultural
traits of these groups. We are specifically interested in
the Italian-Americans. Who were these Italians that came in
masses to the United States between 1880 and 1924? Statis-
tics 1 tell us that 80% of them were from Southern Italy and
85% were unskilled and 50% illiterate. In short, they were
the poor, the oppressed, the voiceless. Upon their arrival in
America, they were often labeled dirty and stupid dagoes,
but the cause of their poverty and intellectual inferiority
was not their Italianity but their socio-economic class --
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they were peasants. Their cultural traits were not due to
their national origin but to their economic origin -- the
lowest strata of a society.
They were the oppressed. They left the oppression of
their native Italy only to find an American immigrant brand
of oppression. Their sense of inferiority, a cultural trait
which greatly handicapped them, was the consequence of their
oppression in Italy. They arrived with this sentiment of
inferiority and in the face of further oppression here could
not rebel for they were not a strong, conscious, articulate
and organized group. A state of inferiority either eventu-
ally leads to rebellion or remains resignation -- a closing
in on oneself in order to survive.
To better understand the experience of this group in
America, we must first briefly look at the conditions of the
Southern Italian peasants in their homeland.2 At the time of
the first mass emigration of Italians to America in 1880,
major cultural and economic differences persisted in the var-
ious Italian regions despite the attempt to eliminate them
with the Unification of Italy in 1861. Generally speaking,
there were still two Italies -- the North and the South, the
latter a backward region with a feudal social system, archaic
agricultural methods and poor land, the former a more modern
society which benefited from an industrialized economy and
fertile land.3
The South was the land of the "latifondo": large landed
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estates controlled by absentee landlords. The latifundium
system exploited both man and nature: water scarcity, depleted
soil fertility, and deforestation were some of the consequences
of this archaic agricultural system. The exploited individuals
were the peasants and their families. By peasant, I mean both
the contadini and giornalieri (day laborers); men who worked
the land but did not own it and usually lived in poor and
crowded quarters in distant towns. While a few peasants did
manage to own small parcels of land, there was usually not e-
nough produce for their subsistence. 4
The following two selections by the contemporary Italian
writer, Elio Vittorini, acutely depict the conditions and
status of the Southern Italian peasant: 5
On the Sicilian latifundium, it rarely happens
that he who has sown gathers the harvest. At
harvest time in June, strange men encamp in the
village squares, going away each morning and re-
turning every night; strange men who seem to be-
long to another race: thin, bony, sun-burnt,
blinking eyes, and they are not called peasants,
they are called reapers, "meticaliti". The vil-
lage children fear them the way they fear the
gypsies. Do they really belong to another race?
They are of that same race which in winter has
spaded, ploughed, and then sown, but their faces
now show the signs of the privations suffered
during those months the landlords didn't need
them. Even today a large number of Sicilian
peasants are taken on and discarded: are taken
on, plough, and are discarded; taken on, sow,
and are discarded, and only a few of them happen
to reap the same grain they have sown. They
aren't peasants: they're spaders, they're sowers,
they're reapers. Just as the earth isn't land;
it's a latifundium.
Architecture is very simple for the poor in Puglia.
It's very functional, very rational; its only func-
tion is to delimit with four walls and cover with a
22
roof the space in which a man, a woman, two old
people, six or seven children, and a beast of
burden can lie outstretched. There are no un-
necessary openings; only the one which serves
as an entrance. In this way, even men become
very rational, without troublesome needs, good
only for what is useful (to the bosses); working
when it's useful that they work, and dying of
hunger when it's useful that they die of hunger.
The peasants and especially the giornalieri were from
the bottom strata of a society based on a rigid caste system
which sharply differentiated the gentry (galantuomini, pro-
minenti) from the artisans and merchants and from the peas-
ants. Interaction among the three groups was prevented or
minimized through tradition ("pari con pari") and a social
consciousness which was confined to the interests of own's
own group. In addition, peasants were not allowed to parti-
cipate in local affairs.6 The life of the peasants, and parti-
cularly of the giornalieri, was a life of total subjugation
since their "[...]livelihood depended entirely on the whims of
their masters and the seasons[... ] It was a life of disper-
azione and miseria -- despair and misery; fear of man, god
and elements; dread of the future, hunger and disease."7 Such
an existence engendered a psychological state of resignation
and a feeling of inferiority.
The peasants were pretty much passively resigned to class
segregation and social advancement was sought only as family
advancement -- a desire to keep up with or be better off than
the next peasant family. 8
The "famiglia," the basic unit of the Southern Italian pea-
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ant society, is an extended family seen as an inclusive social
world". Its members were bound by traditions and codes such
as: male domination and leadership, family solidarity, exlu-
sion of outsiders, pursuit of family and not community inter-
ests.9 Familism was a double-faced reality: on the one hand,
it gave the peasant the illusion of defending himself against
the exploitation of the ruling class and society in general;
on the other hand, it gave the ruling class better control of
the masses by minimizing social interaction and maximizing
competition among peasant families.
The state of marginality and inferiority of the peasant
was also preserved because compulsory education was not en-
forced and illiteracy was widespread. This was evidently to
the satisfaction of the upper classes and clergy who saw in
the education of the peasant an eventual threat to their so-
cial and economic status and stability. Compulsory education
also did not appeal to the peasant because of his short-term
interests. Unable to see the possible long-term advantages of
education, he saw only a threat from the outside world which
could destroy the social and economic stability of his family.
Children would no longer be able or might no longer want to
work to support the family and might even eventually question
its values. The home was thus the school for the child --
transmitting cultural, social, and moral values (often through
folklore) and maintaining stability through the various gener-
ations. 10
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Contrary to what one might expect, the peasants also
distrusted the Church and anticlericalism was prevalent among
them because of the alliances between the clergy and upper
classes. 11 What is also interesting is that the peasants'
religion consisted of an adherence to the Catholic faith
supplemented by pagan beliefs and rituals. The peasant thus
depended on magic conceptualizations of his natural and so-
cial milieu rather than on logical and rational apprehension
of it. 12
It is not difficult to understand why values, practices,
and conditions such as: magic influences, illiteracy, familism,
"[...] lack of organization, lack of leadership, political im-
maturity, suspicion of authority and legalized government, and
lack of civic experience and responsibility," 1 3 and finally a
deep sentiment of inferiority which characterized the Southern
Italian peasant and immigrant at the turn of the century would
contrast sharply with the values and way of life of the modern
rapidly evolving industrial and urban America he came to. The
traits and behavior of the Southern Italian immigrants, which
are certainly not the "unchanging elements" of Italians but
"remnants of a peasant culture, a culture of poverty," 1 4 cer-
tainly played a key role in the way they perceived and related
to American society at large.
Yet how did a supposedly resigned peasant find the desire
and courage to emigrate? There is an apparent contradiction
between resignation and the desire for change which emigration
25
obviously implies.
In our generalized characterization of the Southern Ital-
ian peasant, we have portrayed an individual who accepted his
state of marginality and was distrustful of outside changes
which could lead to further oppression. He sought only changes
and improvements of a short-term nature which did not transcend
class stratification. Yet there were certain attempts to trans-
gress these limits. There had been sporadic, spontaneous and
unorganized rebellions against landlords before the Italian
Unification, and peasants had fought with the revolutionary,
Garibaldi, thereby manifesting a desire to fight for change.
But the Unification of Italy did nothing for the peasant
and disillusionment set in for many. Some overly manifested
their discontent through "brigantaggio" (Robin Hood Italian
style). 15
In a nation where revolution seemed impossible for the
peasant, emigration became the only other possible alternative
for improving his human condition. Emigration, however, is
not a one-way phenomenon characterized only by "push factors,"
but, as Lopreatol6 points out, is a phenomenon caused by a
combination of push-pull factors. Push factors are those in
the migrant's society which prevent him from improving his
status and thus discourage him from staying there, while pull
factors are those aspects of the new society which attract the
migrant by increasing his desire for improvement and change.
Yet for the attraction to materialize into actual emi-
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qration, intermediaties were needed. While the sporadic
flights from Italy prior to 1880 could have encouraged fur-
ther emigration, the most determining factor for the mass
emigration of 1880 were probably the agents. Sent to Italy
to obtain cheap labor for American contractors and railroad
companies, they found a peasant audience most receptive to
their propaganda. Their promises of earning and saving sub-
stantial sums of money in a short time encouraged the migra-
tion of multitudes of peasants.
Usually the men left alone, thereby maintaining definite
ties with their homeland and seeing in this flight a temporary
one which would permit them to eventually return to Italy with
enough money to buy land and lead a better life. The dream
of return prevaled even among those who had left with their
families. Their stay in America thus became a sort of limbo
-- an attempt to build up one's resources and await one's re-
turn to the homeland.
But the state of limbo was more a form of hell for the
Italians and this was due in part to the oppression of the
agents. They exploited the immigrants by overcharging for
their boatfare, keeping a percentage of their earnings as an
employment fee, and thus succeeded in controlling their lives
in America for quite some time. However, notwithstanding this
exploitation, the level of subsistence in America was still
higher than it had been for the peasant in Southern Italy and
therefore most found it convenient to stay.
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The attitude of the Italian government towards emigration
was basically one of careless laissez-faire as is reflected
in this statement which accompanied the Crispi Legislation of
1887: "L'emigrazione e' un fatto che non si ha il diritto di
sopprimere e non si hanno i mezzi di impedire" (Emigration is
a fact which we don't have the right to surpress nor the means
to prevent).18 The lack of emigration regulations reflects
the Italian government's inability or unwillingness to promote
economic development and social reforms which would eliminate
the emigration process at its roots and indicates that permis-
sive emigration policies were used by the government as a
security valve for maintaining social and economic stability
and eliminating the threat of an eventual peasant revolution.
The emigrants therefore left Italy without any legal pro-
tection against exploitation in foreign countries and without
even a minimal preparation for emigration. It was only later
(1900-1919) that the Italian government finally adopted leg-
19islation to protect emigrants, but by that time more than four
million Italians had already left their country without assis-
tance and ignorant of their rights. Given their peasant cul-
tural traits and the lack of Italian government assistance and
protection, they were beginning their stay in America on a very
shaky threshold.
28
Arrival of Italian Immigrant Family
at New York Harbor
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN-AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (PART I)
"These people are not fit to live in a nice house. Let them
go where they can, and let my house stand...
From midnight till far into the small hours of the morning
the policeman's thundering rap on closed doors is heard,
with his stern command, "Apri port'!" on his rounds gather-
ing evidence of illegal overcrowding. The doors are opened
unwillingly enough -- but the order means business, and the
tenant knows it even if he understands no word of English
-- upon such scenes: In a room not thirteen feet either way
slept twelve men and women, two or three in bunks set in a
sort of alcove, the rest on the floor. A kerosense lamp
burned dimly in the fearful atmosphere, probably to guide
other and late arrivals to their 'beds', for it was only
just past midnight."
(From Jacob Riis, How the Other Half Lives)
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The Statue of Liberty's lamp must have dimmed for the
majority of immigrants who came in 1880, for they did not
find the "golden door"1 but rather doors open to sweat and
toil. They came to the United States as cheap labor.
In 1880, post-Civil War American society was undergoing
a major transformation. With the abolition of slavery and
the economic growth induced by the war, the nation was
searching for a new social order and therefore for new forms
of social exploitation. The ruling forces of America were
transforming a basically rural and agricultural society into
an urban and industrial one. In the process, the northeastern
region became suddenly urbanized and industrially developed,
while in the southern and western regions an attempt was made
to modernize the agricultural system, which resulted in a
mechanization of production (with a consequent dependence on
industry for the necessary machines) and a diminuation in the
manpower employed. As a result, many people migrated from
rural to urbanized areas where industrial production was
taking place and manpower was needed. 2
Industrialization also resulted in the concentration of
wealth in the hands of a few. The accumulation of capital was
facilitated by legislation which openly favored the formation
of financial and industrial monopolies. Financial capitalists
became a new ruling class who seized and expanded their power
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during the industrialization of America. By the end of the
1880's, it was clear that American society no longer resembled
the agrarian democracy idealized by Jefferson; it was instead
becoming the industrial and financial plutocracy envisioned
by Hamilton.3
The new industrial growth required additional manpower and
new markets for the consumption of produced goods. For these
reasons industrialists favored and promoted mass immigration.
Propaganda campaigns describing the "promised land" as a
place of "wealth and comfort" attracted millions of Southern
and Eastern Europeans. Yet the majority of them did not find
the promised frontier on the other side of the ocean, but
crowded and filthy tenements and shacks to sleep in and sewers,
mines, and factories to work in.
The Italians constituted the largest group of immigrants
arriving in the Unived States between 1880 and 1924. Two im-
portant factors characterize their pattern of settlement.
First, "the mass migration at the turn of the centruy estab-
lished the basic regional distribution of Italian immigrants;
the post-1924 flows followed the already established channels
of communication and movement." 5 Most of them settled in the
northeast and Great Lakes region. Smaller groups ventured to
California and Missouri where large Italian communities even-
tually developed. Secondly, the Italians concentrated in urban
6
areas.
Why did Italian immigrants settle in these regions and
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concentrate in urban areas if most of them were peasants?
Several hypotheses have been submitted to explain such a
seemingly paradoxical phenomenon. First, it has been argued
that Italian immigrants did not have enough money to travel
further than New York City or for that matter to purchase
farm land. Secondly, as was pointed out in the previous
chapter, Southern Italians were peasants and not farmers.
They were only too glad to give up agricultural work because
of the "human degradation" associated with it in Italy. Third-
ly, many Italians first came to the United States as seasonal
laborers in search of fast earnings and then expected to return
to Italy and buy a small plot of land in order to alleviate
their dependence on the landlords. Living in inner city dis-
tricts close to the working place was, for these Italians, a
convenient temporary solution, especially in economic terms.
Finally, Italian immigrants were sponsored by industrial and
construction entrepreneurs who obviously sent them to indus-
trial and urbanized areas to work and consequently to live.
Each of these hypotheses is basically sound and a theory of
Italian immigrant settlement patterns in the United States
must incorporate them all.
Yet why, when living conditions in immigrant quarters be-
came inhuman because of overcrowding and lack of sanitary ser-
vices, did United States federal and Italian agencies fail in
their attempts to promote a more uniform distribution of aliens
in other less populated areas of the city or regions of the
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country? The fact is that, at the turn of the century, the
government had little control over immigration and the distri-
bution of Italian immigrants which, as for other Eastern and
Southern European nationalities, was instead largely deter-
mined by the "padrone system."8 This was an unofficial
yet well-organized and efficient network of labor distribution
agencies that governed the demand and supply of labor forces
in the United States under the silent promotion of capitalists
and entrepreneurs.
The system was based on an agreement that padroni would
provide laborers to contractors, industrialists, and railroad
companies and subsequently supervise them. The agreement had
advantages for both parties. The employers did not have to
pay employment fees or provide insurance, nor worry about in-
terpreters for the workers, and could count on the padrone,
who literally controlled the lives of laborers, to make certain
that they did not organize themselves in labor movements to
ask for better wages and working conditions. On the other
hand, in order to provide such services to employers, the
padrone had developed a system for controlling the laborers
and making lucrative gains off their backs.
The padrone system was a capillary network of agents.and
subagents including bankers and steamship representatives.
They were located in urbanized areas of the United States where
laborers were needed and in small villages or provinces of
Italy where laborers were available. When a contractor needed
40
laborers for a particular job, he contacted a padrone in the
immigrant district where laborers were "stored" in boarding
houses. The subagents would then recruit the necessary work-
ers, and when the demand exceeded the supply, workers would
arrive from Italy. The padrone, working closely with Italian
bankers and steamship owners, would usually anticipate the
necessary transportation fares. And upon their arrival in
America, the padrone would collect a transportation rebate
from the laborers and would make profits by overcharging them
for room and board and employment fees ("bossatura").
The number of Italian immigrants dependent on such an ex-
ploitive system was ever increasing and by the end of the
nineteenth century, padroni controlled two-thirds of the Ital-
ian laborers in New York City while similar levels were being
reached in Chicago and other cities.9 The padrone system
flourished for quite some time and various legislative at-
tempts10 to control it were unsuccessful, because they tried
to punish the intermediaries and obviously did not try to get
at the germ of the plague, that is the capitalists. The sys-
tem eventually disintegrated when national industrial growth
slowed down and there was no longer any need for new temporary
laborers and when laborers were finally unionized.
The Italian immigrant workers accepted the padrone system
because they had no other alternative; being illiterate, pen-
niless, not knowing the English language, and most importantly
because of the lack of necessary and appropriate services and
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and protection from the United States and Italian governments.
Dependence on the padrcne system undoubtedly provided immed-
iate advantages for the Italian immigrants but in the long
run retarded their assimilation into American society since
they had few contacts with outside institutions.
The padrone system was not a typical Italian phenomenon.1
It was common to other ethnic groups which arrived in the
nineteenth century. A typical form of exploitation in cap-
italistic development, it is still present today in other
parts of the world where industrialized nations (France, West
Germany, etc.) need cheap labor to minimize production costs.
In America, during the second wave of mass immigration (1880-
1924), it helped the industrialists build their empires and
it determined the regional distribution of workers. It was
also largely responsible for the concentration of ethnic
groups in decayed inner city districts which suddenly ac-
quired new economic life becoming additional bonanzas for
bankers and landlords.
Our particular concern is with the evolution of those
inner city districts that were occupied by Italian immigrants
and became known as Little Italies. From an analysis of the
historical development of the oldest Italian communities in
Boston (North End) and New York City (Mulberry Street, West
Village, East Harlem), we can generalize that their evolution
may be divided into three periods corresponding roughly to
the years 1880-1920, 1920-1950, and 1950 to the present.
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The first period, during which the Italians concentrated
in urban areas near the port of arrival, was characterized by
a high degree of population turnover and by a transformation
of the physical structures of the area. At first, the immi-
grants tended to reproduce the social structure they left
in Italy; then, under the pressure of the hosting society,
they made a first attempt to relate to the institutions
found in their districts. In this period, Italian colonies
served two important functions: they were reservoirs of cheap
labor and they functioned as "shock absorbers" for Italian
immigrants in their process of adjustment to the new society
and its culture.
In the second period which begins with the end of mass
immigration, brought about by restrictive laws passed between
1919 and 1924, there was a consolidation of Italians in the
neighborhood which became socially and physically insulated.
The immigrants developed institutions, life-styles, and norms
to preserve their native cultural traits and to defend them-
selves from "outsiders."
The third period, covering from the 1950's until today,
has been characterized by an increased out-migration of second
and third generation residents, by a decay of physical struc-
tures in the neighborhoods, and by a breakdown of values and
social institutions which previously acted as binding forces
in the Italian communities. Some of the communities which are
dealt with in this study, such as East Harlem's Little Italy,
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have already undergone major transformations; others, like
the North End and the Little Italy of Mulberry Street, are
now under pressure for development which could lead to a
drastic alteration of their social content and subsequently
displace many of the poorer residents.
For the remainder of this chapter, we shall focus on the
evolution of Italian-American neighborhoods during the first
period, and shall defer to the next two chapters the dis-
cussion of the other two periods.
The majority of Italian immigrants arriving at the ports
of Boston and New York City in the 1880's had little choice
in terms of mobility. Whether they came under the padrone
system or not, they were addressed to or attracted by the im-
migrant districts of those cities where they could find lodg-
ing accomodations within their limited economic means. These
already densely populated districts were residential pockets
in the proximity of harbor and commercial facilities. Once
attractive and integrated neighborhoods, they slowly declined
during the post-revolutionary period and became Iinterstitial ar-
eas" 1 2 during the first wave of mass immigration (1825-1860)
when the Irish, Germans, and other ethnic groups settled
there. Many immigrants stayed only temporarily in the areas
and moved to other regions as soon as they acquired the nec-
essary financial means. Others, like the Irish, remained in
the districts and developed strong communities, controlling
most of the local cultural and political institutions.
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When Southern Italians came to these predominantly Irish
districts, there were, however, already smaller subcommunities
formed by Northern Italians between 1850 and 1880. The North-
ern Italian immigrants had come mainly from the regions of
Liguria and Tuscany. As a small group, comprised of many
educated and skilled members, they were more "assimilable"
even though they remained mostly in their enclaves. Their
subcommunities functioned as nuclei which attracted the masses
of Southern Italians to these districts.
It is likely that some Northern Italians, who had settled
in the districts during earlier periods, organized the first
padrone system which brought the Southern Italian immigrants
into their subcommunities. The Southern Italian immigrants
lived at first in padrone controlled boarding houses and,
when they brought their families,13 eventually occupied every
room, basement or stable in the blocks surrounding the first
settlement.
The settlement process, however, was not a chaotic one but
a "chain phenomenon"14 where familism and localism were the
binding forces that produced a "mosaic of subcommunities."
In the Italian colony there was a correspondence between social
and spatial subdivisions: generally, each subneighborhood rep-
resented a different Italian region; a group of streets, a
province; a street or block, a town or village; and finally,
in tenements were concentrated extended families.
Such a pattern of settlementl5 reflects not only the con-
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tinuation of a general North-South opposition and a local
village and regional antagonism carried over from Italy, but
manifests the human need of clinging first to one's family
and then to one's paesani when one is among strangers in a
place breeding insecurity. Familism and localism remained
the associative criteria for the first clubs, mutual aid and
fraternal societies that were organized by Italian immigrants
in various subneighborhoods. These nevertheless testified
to the Italian immigrant's partial encounter with the host
society, for these associative institutions were not trans-
planted from Italy, but emulative of those found in the orig-
inal multi-ethnic districts.1 6
The large influx of Southern Italians and other immigrants
from Southern and Eastern Europe into these districts produced
serious living condition problems such as over-crowding and
caused many of the other ethnic groups to move elsewhere. By
the end of the 1880's, the immigrant districts were the most
overcrowded areas of Boston and New York, with densities reach-
ing 1100 inhabitants per acre. The ever-increasing demand
for additional housing encouraged speculators and absentee
landlords to charge the immigrants increadibly high rents and
to build new abusive constructions in almost every backyard.
Newly infilled blocks became unsanitary and, as the photos and
words of Jacob Riis vividly testify, living conditions were
simply unbearable. Inevitably, disease spread, crime and death
rates rose, and conflicts between old resident groups and new-
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comers took on racial overtones. 1 9
The plight of Italians and other immigrants attracted pub-
lic attention and consequently local health and housing leg-
islation was enacted to ameliorate sanitary and living condi-
tions.20 Health authorities were granted unprecedented powers
to set restrictive building codes and to ensure better sani-
tary standards. The enforcement of such legislation during
the 1890-1920 period, produced a radical physical transfor-
mation in most immigrant districts. Dilapidated wooden struc-
tures were either replaced by tenement buildings or were de-
molished to create new playgrounds and public services such as
schools and churches. 2 1
The problems created by immigrants in large American cities
also concerned the "nativists" who feared that the new "ignor-
ant" and "immoral" masses would be a threat to American insti-
tutions. Protestant Churches, in particular, seemed to be
convinced that the problems of immigrants in overcrowded ghet-
tos would be alleviated if the immigrants could first be evan-
gelized and Americanized. Missions were therefore sent to the
new ethnic communities to help the foreign population appreci-
ate the greatness of American institutions and to set behav-
ioral models and standards. 22 Their goal was to assimilate the
masses:
No greater opportunity ever came to the Christian
people of America to do mission work than to evan-
gelize, Christianize, Americanize and assimilate
these multitudes of immigrants in our midst into
one composite people, united, liberty-loving, flag-
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loving, God-fearing, Christ-following, Christian. 2 3
The work of Protestant missions was particularly intense
in Italian communites because Southern Italians seemed reluc-
tant and slow in adopting American ideals and their manifesta-
tions of religiosity were considered perverse, even by the
Catholic Church. This, however, was an arrogant misinterpre-
tation of reality and indicated that religious authorities
lacked an understanding of the cultural attitudes and back-
ground of Southern Italians as it has been pointed out by
H.S. Nelli:
Critics who saw an irreligious attitude in im-
migrant superstition and idolatry ignored the
fact that image-worship, especially of the Vir-
gin, and anthromorphic views of nature and re-
ligion made Catholicism comprehensible to the
unlettered mind. In the same way, critics con-
sidered the Italians' addiction to festival,
procession and feasts as a perversion of re-
ligion, although to participants they formed
an integral part of worship. Immigrants who
celebrated these functions in American did so
not only in an effort to re-establish those
elements of religion which had strongly ap-
pealed to them in Italy, but also to counter-
act Irish influences in their new churches.
Thus what seemed to Americans to be a falling
away from religion was at least in part an
adaption of old habits to new conditions. 2 4
In the Italian colonies of New York and Boston, the Meth-
odist was the first Protestant mission (followed by the Bap-
tists, Congregational and Episcopalian ones) which attempted
to proselyte the immigrants while offering them services and
assistance. 25 Their programs included child-rearing, health
care, employment referral, and language courses for adults.
However, the impact that these missions had on Italian immi-
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grants was limited, notwithstanding some positive results,
because only small groups were attracted and these were the
ones which eventually moved out of the colonies. In addition,
missionaries would often overtly attack the exploitive insti-
tutions of the colonies, accusing them of controlling the pop-
ulation and of retarding their assimilation. This attitude
generated resentment and conflicts in the communities, and
with the rise of national Catholic parishs and the prolifera-
tion of governmental agencies, the Protestant missions were
forced to close down and leave the colonies after World War I.
The exploitative institutions,26 attacked by the mission-
aries, had emerged in the Italian colonies bacause of the in-
ability and inadequacy of the host society to deal with the
pressing needs of immigrants. These institutions, which were
an evolution of the padrone system and were controlled by
"prominenti" (prominent persons), provided the immigrants with
minimal but essential services while monitoring most of the
economic and social life of the community.
The prominenti were persons who acquired economic status
in the Italian community by taking advantage of the social
and psychological conditions and the language problems of the
immigrants. Most of them owned a "banca." This was not a
traditional banking institution but a sort of "social empor-
ium"27 where immigrants could obtain information and advice.
At the same time, it operated as a travel agency, public
notary, employment center, mailroom, and savings denosit. The
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prominenti bankers were initially associated with the padrone
system and therefore controlled the work contracts of most
laborers in the colony. While providing the above-mentioned
services, the prominenti exploited the immigrants by not pay-
ing interest on their savings and by investing them in board-
ing houses and tenements for which immigrants were charged
exorbitant rents.
The prominenti extended their control over the immigrants
in other spheres of community life. Most of them, in fact,
were the founders of local societies and editors/owners of lo-
cal newspapers. Their societies were somewhat different from
the old welfare-oriented mutual aid fraternities set up by
immigrants. The new societies were mainly recreational and
often organized parades and processions which were used by
the prominenti as occasions to reinforce their power over the
community. Other societies, which were financed by the Ital-
ian government to provide the immigrants with some legal pro-
tection and assistance, were instead used by prominenti to
extend their influence outside the community.
The control of local newspapers permitted the prominenti
to manipulate public opinion and keep the community fragmented
and isolated. In fact, the editorial politics of the news-
28
papers was often contradictory. The newspapers would, for
example, praise American institutions in order to criticize
local Italian community societies they did not control; or
would print long discourses about Italianita', patriotism and
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other similar rhetoric to criticize missions, social workers
or labor unions which could undermine their power in the
community. 29
The prominenti-bankers' hegemony over immigrants faded
after World War I when the government imposed new regulations
on their banking operations which therefore limited the forms
of exploitation and the power they had in the Italian commun-
ities.
The hegemony of prominenti in Italian colonies was further
weakened by the Labor Unions (American Federation of Labor
and others) which succeeded in the 1910's in organizing sev-
eral powerful locals there. 3 0 The establishment of these lo-
cals played a major role in the evolution of Italian colonies
because immigrants transcended associative patterns based on
familism and localism, and, for the first time, manifested
class solidarity and political consciousness. Socialist
unions such as the Industrial Workers of the World were able
to cross ethnic and racial lines and build coalitions of Ital-
ian, Jewish, Irish, and other ethnic workers. Many of them
were eventually radicalized and successful strikes were organ-
ized. 3 1 The large participation of immigrants in these strikes
worried not only the ethnic prominenti but also the moderate
labor organizations and the ruling class of America.
Striking and waving red flags was playing with fire. But
immigrant workers were not aware of the powerful fire extin-
guishers that capitalists were about to operate. Nativists
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were joined by capitalists in their campaign to obtain restric-
tive immigration measures and the United States government
promptly responded to such pressure by enacting laws, between
1917 and 1924, which openly discriminated against Southern,
Eastern European and Asian groups. Yet this was only the be-
ginning of a movement which used the "red scare" as a strategy
and the Sacco and Vanzetti case32 as an example against those
workers, radicals or ethnic groups which would not accept or
would dare to question the social institutions of America.
Many intellectuals, both here and abroad, understood quite
well the political implications of the execution of Sacco and
Vanzetti and protested vehemently against the United States
government. But for the residents of the North End (and other
Italian colonies), when the coffins of Sacco and Vanzetti were
paraded along Hanover Street, the message was clearly another
one. The psychological lynching began to affect them and
their choice was either to hide their "self" in the closet or
heed the words of Theodore Roosevelt:
[...]There is no room in this country for
hyphenated Americanism[... ]Americanism is a
matter of the spirit and of the soul. Our
allegiance must be purely to the United States
[...]The man who calls himself an American
citizen and who yet shows by his actions that
he is primarily the citizen of a foreign land,
plays a thoroughly mischievous part in the
life of our body oolitic. He has no Dlace
here[.. ]The only man who is a good American
is the man who is an American and nothing
else[ ... ]33
The process of their Americanization had begun under the
benevolent and paternalistic guidance of Woodrow Wilson and
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other nativists:
[...]This process of Americanization is going
to be a process of self-examination, a process
of purification, a process of rededication to
the things which America represents and is
proud to represent[...]34
[... ]Americanization is the process of sharing
in and promoting the ideals, aims, activities,
and practice of basic American governmental
principles, American freedom of thought,
American schooling and languaqe, and the best
manners, habits, and customs of America[...]35
"Americanization" is assimilation in the United
States. It is that process by which immigrants
are transformed into Americans. It is not the
mere adoption of American citizenship, but the
actual raising of the immigrant to the American
economic, social and moral standard of life.
Then has an immigrant been Americanized only when
his mind and will have been united with the mind
and will of the American so that the two act
and think toqether. 3 6
And so the litany of Americanization goes on and on to
outline the norms of American institutions and the values of
the American way of life. But, behind this mystifying facade,
the process implied an unfair imposition of the ruling class
on the new immigrants. Writing on the nature of inequality,
R. Dahrendorf states: "[...]we should remember that the se-
lection of norms always involves discrimination" 3 7 and adds
that "the origin of inequality is[...] to be found in the
existence in all human societies of norms of behavior to which
sanctions are attached." 3 8 By imposing the norms of American-
ization, the ruling class had added another dimension to the
already existing economic and political inequalities and legit-
imized the resulting social stratification in which the Ital-
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ian immigrants were to occupy, not by choice but by default,
one of the lowest places.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN-AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (PART II)
"He said,'Chick, I like to see you in college, you'd make a
jackass of yourself the way you talk and act.' ... I was very
sensitive about those things, and that hurted me. Right af-
ter that I went uptown and bought two books. One was a book
on English, and the other was a book of etiquette. I don't
know why I bought that book of etiquette, but when I got
home, I read it through. I wanted to know everything I
should do and not do."
(From William F. Whyte's Street Corner Society)
"In the course of time our Italian friends who stay here will
be assimilated and Americanized, and learn to do right as we
do right, and wrong as we do wrong. Schooling in our public
schools will make an enormous difference to those who get it.
But meanwhile, and especially in communities where large
bands of Italians come and go according to the call of the
labor market, better local provision will have to be made
for taking care of them. No American village, certainly no
suburban community hereabouts, is going to accept for long,
and endure the thought that persons using its highways are
liable to be stopped and robbed by Sicilian banditti."
(From Harper's Weekly -- July 3, 1909)
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Americanization is a process of metamorphosis of the self,
forfeiting an identity rooted in the past in exchange for a
new image tailored by the ruling class. The new identity is
one based on individualism, social mobility, faith in Progress
and Capitalism. The prize for those who undergo Americani-
zation is social acceptance and economic advancement. But
Americanization is inevitably a selective process because not
everyone can pay the price and those who are unable or not
willinq to Americanize are penalized and become socially
marginal.
The evolution of Italian-American neighborhoods in the
post World War I period is characterized by a community in-
sulation resulting from the residents' inability to respond to
the pressures of Americanization, which required not only a
transformation of the self but also a radical change in life-
style.
The American lifestyle of the 1920's was determined by
the evolution of capitalism and industrial production. The
new technology (assembly line, etc.) used by industrialists
aimed at maximizing the production process (in order to max-
imize profit) and made new commodities (cars, electrical
appliances, etc.) more economically and readily available to
consumers. Advertisement was used to articulate an American
dream of avid consumption. To facilitate the acquisition of
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all these gadgets and goodies, the capitalists invented the
installment payment plan which resulted in an increased level
of private debt and dependency on banks.
Suburban living was increasingly advocated to market the
nifty inventions of Ford, General Electric and other rising
industrial empires. Suburbanization was also an expression
of new forms of social control because it favored new life-
styles and residential patterns of social segregation along
economic, class, and racial-ethnic lines. For immigrants,
suburban living became an expected prerequisite for American-
ization. obviously, only those who had acquired the necessary
economic means, had been educated, and had undergone cultural
distanciation (generally the second and third generaticnslwere
moving to suburbia.
The growth of Italian communities was affected by suburban-
ization and by the lack of new immigration. The population of
the colonies began to steadily decline because of the out-mi-
gration of prominenti, businessmen, etc. to suburban areas,
and because there was no inflow due to the restriction placed
on immigration (the 1924 Immigration Act). The people left
in the colonies were mainly the old generation, their young
families, unskilled laborers who could not afford suburban
living, and those who preferred traditional values (familism,
localism, etc.) to modern ones.1
The Italian neighborhood became an insulated yet highly
structured microcosm which was however superfically perceived
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by outsiders as a slum characterized by a "formidable mass
of confusion [and] social chaos."2 For the residents, the
neighborhood performed two very important functions. First,
for those who could not join the mainstream of American so-
ciety, it provided a "protective space," an "cultural re-
treat," a safe world where it was possible to preserve tra-
ditional values, to develop a strong sense of communal sol-
idarity and new forms of lifestyle that were conditioned by
the background of the immigrants and by the insulation of
the community but which indicated a voluntary, gradual as-
similation of the residents. Secondly, for those who even-
tually hoped to join the mainstream, it was a sort of pur-
gatory, a place where it was possible to wait and build the
necessary strength (cultural, economic) to climb the ladder
of the American dream.
The major characteristics (insulation, "cultural re-
treat," purgatory) of the evolving Italian communities, during
the period between the wars, were manifested in the spatial
organization and use of the neighborhoods as well as in the
structure of the social system that inhabited them. The spa-
tial organization which developed in the Italian neighborhoods
(and is still easily identifiable) is composed of a core,
where all the major services are concentrated, and of various
subneighborhoods where the immigrants had developed institu-
tions and residential patterns based on localism. The core
is delimited by or in some cases coincides with major streets
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of the neighborhood. Along these, in a sequence that often
reminds one of "la strada vecchia" or "il corso" of an Ital-
ian town, are concentrated most of the commerical activities
such as travel agencies, public notaries, pharmacies, stores
selling Italian products (clothing, shoes, hardware, records),
pasta and pastry shops, produce markets, and whatever else
has been needed by the residents. The Italian ambiance has
been reinforced by the continuous use of sidewalks and shops
as places for socialization. The subneighborhoods are con-
tiguous to the core and generally grew around an open space, a
small square, an intersection, or a church (which usually
symbolized the center of the subcommunity). There were, in
each neighborhood, basic services such as cornerstores, a
barbershop, and bakery, which served the daily needs of the
residents, while the church, parochial schools, religious so-
cieties, and other meeting places gave the residents an op-
portunity to express, share, and transmit to the younger gen-
eration communal values.
The neighborhood, as an insulated environment, offered the
immigrants the opportunity to establish a continuity with and
protection of past traditions and habits. At the same time,
the "institutional completeness"3 of the community minimized
the residents' interaction with the outside urban environment
and institutions. In fact, most of the residents left the
neighborhood only to work and confined their social interactions
and leisure activities to the community.
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This state of confinement facilitated the evolution of
closely-knit social relationships among residents. While
the "family" remained the most important institution for
the old immigrants, the values and norms it embodied (solid-
arity, mutual obligations, respect for male leadership, so-
cial interaction limited to insiders of a group) were trans-
cended to more communal forms of association. These extend-
ed to a neighborhood scale the opportunities for social in-
teraction which, oriqinally for immigrant peasants, were con-
fined to kinship and localism affiliations.
One of the most important communal organizations among
young working class males became the street corner gang.4
It was based on a code of reciprocal olbigations, clear hier-
archical distinctions between leaders and followers, and rou-
tine and organized activities where performance greatly deter-
mined group status. Generosity was an expected attribute,
especially of leaders, and while members had the desire to
get ahead in their gangs and neighborhood, this desire was
always checked by reciprocal obligations to which they were
bound. Although the gang was a self-functioning group with
its own rules, it was nevertheless embedded in the societal
framework of the neighborhood and was concerned with its well-
being and advancement.
For street gang members, there was a certain effacement of
the individual for the benefit of group relationships and cer-
tainly an interaction with and contribution to neighborhood
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life. Yet for "college boys,"5 young Italian-Americans who
wanted to make the American dream theirs and were in the pro-
cess of breaking away from traditional values, the neighbor-
hood was more a state of purgatory -- a place to wait before
joining the mainstream, before moving out of the neighborhood.
Egoism was necessary for social mobility and individual ad-
vancement and the college boy therefore did not form close
friendships or did not hesitate to give up those which did
not benefit his advancement in American society. The college
boy thus lived his stay in the Italian neighborhood as a tran-
sition or rather didn't live it, didn't contribute at all
to its societal mechanisms since his ideals and dreams could
only be realized outside the neighborhood and he was fast
learning that his roots and present reality had to be forfeited
for their realization.
This dichotomy between corner gang and college boy epito-
mizes the dilema of the Italian immigrant caught between the
choice of clinging to his roots and being reduced to a state
of marginality or negating his roots as the price for individ-
ual success and advancement in American society.
There were, however, institutions in the neighborhood --
the parishes and settlement houses -- which attempted to help
residents deal with this dilemna. The Italian parishes were
the most important organizations which encouraged the develop-
ment of a community consciousness and defended the ethnic i-
dentity of their members. These, as other national parishes,
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evolved as a result of the struggle, within the Catholic
Church, between Irish clergymen who advocated the immediate
Americanization of immigrants, and various ethnic groups who
demanded more flexibility and autonomy. The Italian parishes
are seen by Silvano Tomasi as quasi-sects and are described
as:
[...]place[s] where immigrant Italians who
were on the religious and social periphery
of society, could fulfill their religious
needs, find opportunity for self expression,
preserve their self-perception of being h man
in face of an unknown social environment.
The parishes in the Italian neighborhoods immediately be-
came catalysts for cultural evolution and social integration.
By accepting the background and traditions of the peasants from
Southern Italy, the parish became the fulcrum around which the
immigrant culture developed and the community strengthened it-
self. In fact, as Tomasi argues:
The ethnic parish accepted the folkloristic
religious manifestations of the immigrants;
justified their moralism; never rejected their
Italianits. It recreated, therefore, a cul-
tural community in which the immigrants were
aware of "being-of-a-kind," of participating
in a common patrimony of symbolic meanings,
myths, memories, traditions and values.7
Openly speaking about cultural pluralism- the Italian
parishes offered a valuable alternative to the process of Amer-
icanization as the path to social integration. Their strategy
aimed, first, at reinforcing the ties among the various sub-
communities of the neighborhood by transcending their cultural
differences in a common ethnic culture, and, then favoring a
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"gradual assimilation" of the group, not the individual, into
the new society.
In every Italian neighborhood, after World War I, ethnic
parishes provided most of the recreational activities and
services of assistance which Protestant missions used to offer.
As a result, the missions and most other services set up to
help immigrants were closed down and the parishes remained the
most important supporting institution of the Italian commun-
ities.
The priests of these parishes played very important roles.
Within the Catholic Church, they became advocators of cultural
pluralism and "mediators between the establishied ecclesias-
tical structures and the immigrants attached to the cultural
expressions of their peasant faith and their sentimental na-
tionalism."8 Within the Italian communities, they became re-
spected leaders, offered services and legal advice to needy
immigrants, and became catalysts for the evolution of paro-
chial schools which were shortly favored by the immigrant
families because such schools were not as intolerent of the
child's cultural background and language as public schools
were.
In contrast with the efforts of Italian parishes to iden-
tify themselves with the reality of the neighborhood and to
help immigrants develop a strong sense of community, the set-
tlement house remained very much an outside institution im-
posed on the Italian communities to encourage individual so-
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cial mobility and to set behavioral standards for those who
were already on the verge of moving out of the neighborhood.
After the closing of Protestant missions, settlement
houses became the most important "American" institution oper-
ating in the Italian communities. As community centers and
social welfare agencies, the houses continued to provide res-
idents with important socializing (picnics, dances, day camps)
and educational (lectures and films on child rearing, medical
care, English language courses, job training) activities.
Yet, they remained institutions alien to the majority of the
residents and were unable or unwilling to deal with their pro-
blems and needs.
According to William F. Whyte, the limited interaction
between settlement houses and neighborhood residents, especi-
ally first generation men, was due to the fact that the houses
were run by non-Italian, middle class, usually female social
workers who had "no systematic knowledge of the social back-
grounds of the people in their Italian homeland,"9 nor did
they understand the social evolution taking place in the
neighborhood because of their conviction that assimilation was
a " one way adaption" achieved through upward mobility and
through the acceptance of middle class values. Consequently
the settlement houses attracted and dealt with those second
generation individuals who were already rebelling against
local values and traditions and not with those who were loyal
to them (college boys vs. corner gang boys).l0
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Loyalty to local traditions and values meant, for those
who remained in the neighborhoods, the acceptance of a high-
ly structured social system which Whyte describes as a "close-
ly knit hierarchical organization in which people's positions
and obligations to one another are defined and recognized."1
In addition, he argues that the people's acceptance of a com-
munity hierarchy seemed to reflect their belief in a religi-
ous supernatural order which in turn conditioned the way re-
lationships between the community and society at large were
handled. In fact, residents of a typical Italian neighbor-
hood, Cornerville (North End, Boston), seemed to believe and
act as if:
[...]society is made up of big people and
little people -- with intermediaties ser-
ving to bridge the gaps between them. The
masses of Cornerville people are little
people. They cannot approach the big peo-
ple directly but must have an intermediary
to intercede for them. They gain this inter-
cession by establishing connections with the
intermediary, by performing services for him,
and thus making him obligated to them. The
intermediary performs the same functions for
the big man. The interactions of big shots,
intermediaries, and little guys build up a
hierarchy of personal relations based upon
a system of reciprocal obligations.1 2
The above passage illustrates the workings of the local
social structure and unfolds two important facts. First, that
notwithstanding the network of reciprocal obligations in the
Italian communities, there seemed to be a definite class stra-
tification (masses, intermediaries, big shots). Second, that
the control of the community was achieved through the practice
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of "intercession" which led to a pyramidal social hierarchy
that allowed only a few "big shots" to deal with the "outside"
and condemned the majority of the community to a perpetual
state of subservience and insulation. But who were the big
shots? How did they achieve prominence in their community?
How did they control it? How were they linked to the outside?
Two avenues, which sometimes intersected, were commonly
followed by residents of Italian neighborhoods to achieve
prominence in and control of their community: organized crime
and local politics. The leaders or bosses of both domains
were able to exercize a tight control in the community through
a web of mutual obligations which invested the majority of
residents. Both found the defensive insulation of the commu-
nity to be a necessary condition for their personal success
and therefore resisted any attempts that would have altered
the status quo. In turn, both served the purpose of the es-
tablished power structure of American society which used,
first, organized crime to defame Italian-Americans, and, then,
the Italian politician in the alchemy of ethnic fragmentation
to minimize class conflicts at the city as well as national
level.
The rise of organized crime as a controlling institution
in Italian communities began in the 1920's with the illegal
traffic of liquor and, when the National Prohibition Act was
abolished in 1931, continued with the gambling racket. The
bosses played a paternalistic role in the neighborhoods in
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order to set up patterns of dependence and win the solidarity
of the population. They provided jobs and opportunities for
economic advancement to residents hit by unemployment or to
illegal immigrants. In addition, they loaned money to needy
residents and local businessmen and financed recreational
activities. Their generosity, however, was not always cal-
culated, as the following remark by a Cornerville resident to
Whyte reveals:
These gangsters are the finest fellows you
want to meet. They'll do a lot for you,
Bill. You go up to them and say, "I haven't
got a place to sleep," and they'll give you
something. Now you go up to a businessman,
one of the respected members of the community,
and ask him. He throws you right out of the
office.1 3
Gestures like the above were typical of bosses who were praised
in the Italian communities as "free spenders and patrons of lo-
cal enterprises. ,14
The outside society, however, perceived the bosses as gang-
sters and their activities as criminal actions. Through the
manipulation of mass media, organized crime became associated
with Italian-Americans. Daniel Bell has presented a different
view of organized crime which does not see it as deviant be-
havior or a pathological trait of Italians but as a success
story American-style. He has described it as a "queer ladder
of social mobility,"15 as one of the few easily accessible to
uneducated minorities and newly arrived immigrant groups. In
fact, there has been an ethnic succession in the controlling
positions of organized crime: first the Irish and then the
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Jews and Italians, and now Cubans, Blacks, etc. Francis Ianni
goes further in his research to demonstrate that "organized
crime is a viable and persistent institution within American
society,"16 and describes it as "part of the American enter-
prise system, as one end of a continuum which has legitimate
business as the other pole," embedded in the political struc-
ture of cities and federal government.
Local politics was the other opportunity open to ambitious
residents who wanted to acquire prominence in the Italian com-
munity. Italians acquired political control of their wards
only in the 1930's. Until then, district politics was con-
trolled by the powerful Irish political machine. Irish poli-
ticians had socialized former generations of Italian politi-
cians in the art of local politics which, at that time, had
little to do with democratic government. Local politics was
a group affair -- the group that seized the power then had
access to city jobs, welfare assistance, and other advantages.
Italians learned the hard way that only by enforcing community
cohesiveness and solidarity, could they ensure their members
accessibility to jobs and economic security. From the Irish,
Italian politicians inherited the institutional framework
(party organization, district political club, etc.) and the
essential custom of local politics: the practice of patronage,
based on exchanges of votes for favors, a very powerful tool
for community control.
Studies18 about local politicians from inner city Italian
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neighborhoods indicate that party choice was not an ideolog-
ical matter for them. They would lean towards the Democratic
Party if they lacked the personal financial means to run a
campaign, or on the contrary chose the Republican Party if
they were already successful businessmen. There seems to
have been a consistent pattern of cooperation between the
local democratic politician and the racketeers who often
helped to finance his campaign and then used him to obtain
the connections and cover-ups necessary for the bosses' oper-
ation of illegal activites or move into legal or more profit-
able businesses. 9
For community residents, the Italian politician was "an
ambassador to the outside world,"20 someone who could inter-
cede with the unapproachable city bureaucracy, someone who
could do favors and provide jobs. Consequently, a network
of reciprocal obligations was established between the politi-
cian and residents.
Loyalty to Italian traditions and values was a prerequi-
site for a successful election campaign. Italian politicians
were known to exploit their ethnic background for electoral
purposes.21 In doing so, they mythicized the oppresssion
suffered by Italians in America and consoled the electorate by
praising Italy, its rich culture and great people.22 Many
of them enthusiastically hailed Mussolini as the man who won
the respect of Americans for Italians. This strategy, which
we have already seen was used by the prominenti during the pre-
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World War period to keep the neighborhood population socially
insulated and romantically attached to Italy, was successful-
ly utilized by local politicians in order to retain their
leadership in the community. Once elected, many would throw
the weight of their constituencies in the political arena and
use it mainly for personal success. A few more services would
arrive in the neighborhoods, some residents would get a city
job and move out of the community; the rest was business as
usual and the local politician would make his rounds during
the next election.
Some Italian local politicians, such as La Guardia (East
Harlem) and Di Sapio (Greenwich Village), became very skilled
in the political arena of large cities such as New York, and
acquired power, prestige, and even national fame. Their suc-
cess stories have intrigued many sociologists and political
commentators who point out again and again how deeply rooted
ethnicity is in city politics and how important it has been
for Italian politicians to maintain their ethnic neighborhoods
insulated in order to personally have access to the power
house of city government.
We have seen that Americanization, as an act of assimila-
tion, implies the elimination of ethnicity or cultural diver-
sity. We have seen that Americanization also implies social
mobility and individual advancement. We have seen finally
how intermediaries (organized crime, local politicians, and
before them, prominenti and padroni) reinforced ethnicity and
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community insulation (one implying the other) and used them
as an instrument for their own individual social and economic
advancement.
Americanization implies the elimination of ethnicity but
for the intermediary, Americanization implies the reinforce-
ment of ethnicity and community insulation: what was the an-
tithesis or negation of Americanization, becomes incorporated
into the Americanization process itself. Where there was an
attempt to assimilate by an individual who negated his origin-
al identity and abandoned his ethnic group, now there is the
attempt to individually assimilate by someone who reinforces
the ethnic group, controls it for his own advancement and
therefore for the benefit of the ruling class. While the in-
termediary controls the ethnic group for his advancement, in
his hybrid stance of oppressor-oppressed 2 4 he allows the ruling
class to manipulate and control him. In his attempt at indi-
vidual assimilation, he therefore "plays the game" and is co-
opted by the dominant ideology.
Community cohesiveness and solidarity -- a potential source
for human liberation -- becomes, in the hands of intermediaries,
a negative force. The insulation and "protective" dimension
of the neighborhood become instead an instument for the manip-
ulation and exploitation of most of its residents. Far from
being an autonomous microcosm, outside of and insulated from
the System, the Italian neighborhood is instead deeply embed-
ded in the exploitive network of the System.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN-AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (PART III)
"... It is all over. Stickball and stoopball.. .Tar Beach in
the summers...sleeping on fire escapes...dancing on Satur-
day night... strolling along Pleasant Ave.. .the old men sip-
ping black coffee, playing cards, chewing dark cigars...
endless rows of cafes and social clubs...three kids in a
bed.. .doors without locks.. .cobbled streets.. .back-to-back
pastry shops.. .and those candy stores...My Block, Your Block
His Block.. .The Boys.. .The Neighborhood...Little Italy in
East Harlem. Gone."
(From Sunday News, New York, Jan. 7, 1973)
"[...]The city planners destroyed this neighborhood[...]You
can't let planners take over. They don't understand people.
They don't know how the people feel about their community
[...]but it is our fault. We permitted them to take over."
(Leonard Covello)
" 'I have a dream,' Martin Luther King, Jr. intoned.
'I have a dream.'
What is the correlative ethnic dream?
It is based on self-interest; and on the solidarity of
underdogs. It is a dream of the one inevitably, fundamental,
indispensable coalition: blacks and ethnic whites, shoulder-
to-shoulder. It is a dream of frank and open talk about the
needs of each. Above all, honesty.
The first truth is that the hour is late. It is almost as
if polarization were deliberate, as, if the Left intended to
condemn one social group and glorify another, assist one
and penalize another, as if America had to choose between
the two: black niggers, white niggers."
(From Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics)
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The decline of many old ethnic neighborhoods, the birth
of a New Ethnicity movement, and the current neighborhood
preservation crusades are the phenomena that characterize the
evolution of ethnic communities in the post World War II per-
iod. These must be seen as effects of the continuing strug-
gle between the forces of homogenization and counterforces
of diversification in the American society. The dramatic and
paradoxical change in attitude of the ruling class towards
ethnic relations and neighborhood evolution is puzzling to
say the least and should be carefully analyzed. Is it really
true that the ruling class, which for so long advocated the
"melting pot' philosophy, has rejected its original stance and
suddenly embraced the philosophy of cultural pluralism? Has
pluralism been truly accepted in the American society or have
forces of homogenization succeeded in incorporating this anti-
thetical position into their porcess of social control? Is it
possible that forces and institutions which only a few years
ago advocated destructive programs, such as inner city high-
ways and urban renewal, have recognized the shortcomings of
such solutions to urban problems and (now that the damage is
halfway done) have suddenly attempted to rebuild those com-
munities once denigrated or neglected? Does the current ap-
proach to preservation and community development imply a de-
centralization of the decision-making process or is it an at-
tempt by the ruling class to control, through co-option, mar-
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ginal and potentially explosive communities? Such questions
must remain in the foreground in our analysis of the post
World War II evolution of Italian-American neighborhoods.
Until the mid-sixties, the ebb of most inner city neigh-
borhoods was visible in three interrelated phenomena: the
outmigration of residents, the deterioration of neighborhood
physical structures, and the breakdown of neighborhood order
and cohesiveness. Initially the outmigration increased, in
the immediate post-war years, because of new and pre-WWII
housing programs which were conceived, proposed, and enacted
mainly to reverse the negative trends of the national economy.
These programs (VA, FHA) once again favored, although not
surprisingly, suburbanization. While providing the necessary
economic means or guarantees to many white working-class fam-
ilies to move out of old neighborhoods, these programs, or
more precisely the management of these programs, increased
residential segregation along economic and racial-ethnic lines.
In fact, while the white ethnics were moving out of cities and
consolidating themselves in suburban ethnic neighborhoods,
their places in the old neighborhoods were being taken by
Blacks or other minority groups.1
More importantly, these housing programs paved the way for
extensive development whose stated goal was curing the pres-
sing urban problems (ghettos, congestion, etc.). This devel-
opment, however, resulted in the reorganization of the physi-
cal, social, and political order of inner cities. Such re-
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organization was essential to the capitalist system which
continually seeks new opportunities for profit-makinq and
capital accumulation in urban areas. In fact, the housing
programs were quickly followed and complemented by an ex-
pansion of highway programs and by new urban renewal ones
which drastically altered the morphology and role of inner
cities, while providing developers, real estate groups, and
banking institutions with occasions for land speculation and
other profitable real estate operations.
The dynamics of inner city reorganization is complex and
varies according to the specific context; the results how-
ever are clearly visible. Overall, most of the light manu-
facturing labor-intensive industries, once the economic back-
bone of most industrial cities and the source of employment
for immigrants and the poor, were displaced. New technology,
processes of industrial agglomeration, economies of scale, etc.
contributed to and encouraged urban industrial disinvestment.
New industries were relocated along highways or in suburban
industrial parks.
The loss of job opportunities in the proximity of the
neighborhood was a devastating blow to the cohesiveness of
ethnic communities in inner city districts. But that was only
the beginning of the process of inner city reorganization.
The highway program established the necessary framework for
future real estate operations. These controversial programs,
backed by political and economic forces and powerful individ-
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uals such as Robert Moses, were implemented, and in the pro-
cess of constructing highways, inner-belts etc., many ethnic
inner city communities were split, separated, or destroyed
by the inexorable bulldozers while the "asphalt snakes" ad-
vanced in the inner cities, setting up physical barriers and
new boundaries between communities which could stay and oth-
ers which eventually had to be displaced.
The displacement inevitably took place with the urban
renewal programs which brought about profound transformations
of activities and texture in the areas around or affected by
the highway programs. Activities which once intermingled
with residential areas were now segregated. Urban space be-
came "specialized" in its forms and content. Monumental, mon-
olithic, impressive centers (government, central business,
performing arts etc.) mushroomed in most inner cities and their
realization very often implied destruction, displacement or a
threat to still viable communities. Thus, during the fifties
and sixties many inner city neighborhoods were replaced by
tertiary activities which have more intensive levels of land
exploitation and these districts have become the new finanical
and corporate power symbols, the new residence for centralized,
technocratic government, and the employment location for the
middle and upper classes living in suburban areas.
Yet all the billions which were pumped into the redevelop-
ment of inner cities did not eliminate the problems of "blight-
ed areas," nor did they alleviate poverty or provide much ad-
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equate housing for poor residents. As many critics have fre-
quently pointed out, urban renewal became a gold mine for
speculators who used the program to subsidize their financial
operations and therefore, with the complicity of the federal
and city governments, to concentrate in the hands of a few
the control of inner city real estate. The problems of ghet-
tos, poverty and crime, remain in urban areas. They cannot
disappear under a capitalist system; they are vital to its
evolution. They are necessary for justifying the mechanisms
of capital accumulation in urban areas and are therefore tol-
erated by capitalists.
Accumulation of capital is not only achieved through in-
vestment. Disinvestment is often a step that precedes invest-
ment, and it paves the way for very profitable real estate op-
erations in urban areas. Many ethnic communities in inner
city districts have in fact been victims of this cleverly dis-
guised banking policy.
Arthur Naparstek and Gale Cincotta recently investigated
the relationship between disinvestment and inner city decline
and the report of their study indicates that:
Urban deterioration can be traced to certain
institutionalized policies, attitudes and prac-
tices which lead to discrimination and inequi-
ty. The former is directed at race, and the
latter towards the physical properties of neigh-
borhoods. One affects individuals; the other,
whole communities. When either operates, we can
expect racial and ethnic tensions to accelerate
and the inner city to deteriorate.3
The authors argue that disinvestment is the most devastating
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institutionalized policy that affects, through the practice of
"redlining," selected neighborhoods. Naparstek states: "Its
consequences are not restricted to the neighborhood, however,
but reverberate throughout the entire metropolitan area, and
take a costly toll in both human and monetary terms." 4
The study charges that disinvestment is a practice em-
bedded in the activities and regulatory policies of important
branches of the banking industry which deal with housing and
urban problems: the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), and the Federal
Reserve Board. Indeed, findings of the research on the lend-
ing policies of the above organization suggest "the existence
of systematic attitudes and policies prejudical to the inter-
ests of racial and ethnic and low-to-moderate-income citizens
throughout the depository industry." 5 The study concludes by
asking for the disclosure of the banking industry's lending
practices, because this has been felt to be vital information
for understanding the phenomenon of inner city decline and
its relationship to disinvestment. Although the Home Loan
Mortgage Disclosure Act was enacted in 1975, neighborhood
groups have found it difficult to obtain such information
from the banking industry and one is therefore led to.be-
lieve that banks are indeed practicing disinvestment. 6
Yet what is disinvestment? How does this banking policy
affect inner city neighborhoods? Richard and Mary Ann Krickus
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offer a six phase description of the process which clearly
indicates the interdependence between this policy and urban
deterioration and renewal:
1. A neighborhood is comprised of low-to-moderate
income residents, ethnic and/or black; the homes
are old but in good condition; the area is stable
and conventional mortgages for buying or repairs
are available;
2. The neighborhood is singled out by lending in-
stitutions as a "high risk" area and they opt
to grant mortgages in other parts of the city
or in the suburbs; the designation of "high
risk" is based on arbitrary and subjective cri-
teria and reflects the biases of the lending
industry;
3. "Redlining" of the neighborhood begins. This
includes stringent loan requirements, harsh
terms for mortgages such as high interest and
and short loan life, or out and out refusal to
grant a loan. The lending institutions justify
these tactics by claiming to perceive a risk of
deterioration detrimental to their investors;
this judgement is then confirmed by their real
estate appraisers;
4. When all lending institutions have agreed that
a neighborhood is high risk, it is successfully
redlined. There are now no conventional loans
made and the only money available is that
guaranteed by FHA. This guarantee heralds the
arrival of the speculators, the brokers, and
the big investors.
5. Within a few years, the community is "turned
over." Absentee landlordism is now the name of
the game. Maintenance grinds to a halt, ser-
vices decrease, abandonment and crime increase,
and property values decline;
6. With the neighborhood picked clean, it ultimately
reverts back to the city; developers can then
purchase its property at below market prices and
build highly profitable "urban renewal" projects.7
The Krickus conclude that "disinvestment is the total crime
committed on the neighborhood," 8 a most powerful tool in the
hands of the ruling class of America. Disinvestment is a leg-
ally issued license for killing a neighborhood. Naturally, no
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banker, planner, or politician ever gets arrested or indicted
for killing a neighborhood. Such people are covered and de-
fended by the law because they were only providing opportun-
ities or guarantees for the process of capital accumulation
to continue in urban areas. The logic of such a process is
inhumane because it does not consider or properly take into
account the psychological and often financial price that
neighborhood residents have to pay for induced deterioration,
reduction of services, and forced displacement.
Industrial disinvestment, highway and urban renewal pro-
grams, and banking policies have therefore been the real causes
for the outmigration of neighborhood residents, the physical
deterioration and breakdown of the social order in many inner
city ethnic communities since World War II.
The Italian-American neighborhoods dealt with in this thesis
have been affected, and some still are, by the above-mentioned
programs. These once stable and closely-knit communities have
consequently become areas of transition and eventually have
been transformed into middle-class residential areas or into
poorer black-Puerto Rican communities.
In Boston, during the fifties, the Expressway wiped out
thirteen blocks and divided in two the predominantly Italian
communities of the West and North End. The resulting physical
barrier isolated the North End from the rest of the city,
while the West End was subsequently cleared because real es-
tate operators saw its development as an occasion for making
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big profits and the city an opportunity for raising more taxes.
City planners, by assessing that most of the apartments and
tenements were "substandard," provided developers and the city
with the offical justification for the destruction of a still
socially viable community. Thus, with the excuse of better
housing quality standards, more efficient land use (given the
projected market value) and other official reasons,9 the Ital-
ian-American and elderly Jewish community of the West End was
deprived of its habitat and neighborhood. The protest of not
well organized residents was ineffective. The death of the
West End neighborhood had already been signed by the elite
of the city with the complicity of "intermediary" local poli-
ticians who had betrayed their constituencies and were the
first to flee to the suburbs.
On the other side of the Expressway, the North End, which
was also a temporary residence for many displaced West Enders,
underwent major changes. Many residents who felt insecure
about the future of the area moved to suburbia and they were
followed by others who were looking for better housing con-
ditions. The population of the neighborhood began to drop
significantly and the North End declined as an ethnic residen-
tial community. Only activities related to food production
and consumption boomed and the neighborhood has thus become
a regional market place and tourist attraction.
Today, the urban renewal development of the Waterfront is
determining the future of this historic neighborhood which was
89
one of the most famous immigrant colonies in America. The
once cohesive ethnic community will most probably be trans-
formed into a middle and upper class neighborhood with a com-
mercialized ethnic flavor.
The strategy being adopted by planners, developers, and
politicians to facilitate the metamorphosis of the North End
does not advocate the physical destruction of the neighbor-
hood, even if in an artist's sketch of the future of Boston,
included in the city's 1965 Master Plan, it was depicted,
consciously or not, as an empty bulldozed area surrounded by
skyscrapers and awaiting development! Planners have now dis-
covered that old is beautiful and that it can be made fashion-
able too! Now, only after real estate companies and local pol-
ititions/businessmen have, like vultures, secured most of the
available properties. Now that the Waterfront development is
advancing towards the old neighborhood, many apartments or
tenements, which were for long left to deteriorate, are quick-
ly being rehabilitated.
In several blocks of the North End adjacent to the Water-
front, luxuriously rehabilitated three-bedroom apartments are
easily rented at $500-600 per month or sold at $60,000-
65,000. Working-class residents can obviously not afford
such rent levels or prices and are forced to move into less
fashionable suburban areas where prices are still within
their economic means. The outmigration of younger second and
third generation Italian-American residents and the simultan-
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eous infiltration of students and other transient residents
might increase if the proposed plans for the depression of
the Expressway are carried out. The depression of the high-
way is undoubtedly a threat for the community residents and
local businessmen who will face, during the construction
years, discomfort and economic losses. It also poses chal-
lenging questions about the future role of the neighborhood
and about the destiny of those residents who will inevitably
be squeezed out of the area because of economic pressures
building around them.
In New York, another Italian-American neighborhood, the
once prosperous working-class community around Columbia and
President Sts. near the waterfront of Brooklyn, was badly
damaged in 1946 by the construction of the Brooklyn-Queens
Expressway. Subsequently, in 1964, a proposal was submitted
by the Borough planners to transform the area into a contain-
erport and to provide, at the same time, new housing for the
displaced residents next to the industrial park where they
could be employed. The plan was never implemented because of
the strong opposition raised by the powerful Brooklyn Democra-
tic Party bosses who feared that the project would weaken
their political power base. They proposed an alternative plan
which called for a less drastic demolition of the neighborhood.
Yet as of today no final decision has been taken. This has
created a destructive sense of uncertainty about the future of
the area.12
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Since 1964, outmigration has been steadily increasing
while the physical structures have deteriorated because of
the lack of investment. Denis Hamill reports that:
Some people in the area feel the containerport
will never be built but the rumor of it will be
used as a ploy to discourage local residents so
they will evacuate the area. Once these working-
class people are gone, they fear the real estate
investors will rush into the area and buld high-
rise luxury buildings. 1 3
The fear of the residents is more than justified. In fact,
there are indications that the process of property concen-
tration is well under way and we can easily predict what de-
velopers and real estate investors will want to do in the
area in the near future if the residents' outmigration is
not reversed.1 4
In the case of East Harlem and Greenwich Village, urban
renewal programs not only provided developers with occasions
to make profits while using governmental subsidens but, con-
sciously or not, undermined the power base vital to Italian-
American politicians. These two neighborhoods were, in fact,
the vote mines for most of the politicians (such as La Guar-
dia, De Sapio, Marcantonio, Impelletiri, etc.) who had, dur-
ing the past decades, risen to powerful positions. Their
political backing was lost through the outmigration of Ital-
ian-American residents and the infiltration of either more
recent and poorer immigrants (ethnic succession) or middle-
class residents transformed the social and political reality
of the neighborhood.
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In the fifties, the infiltration of Blacks and Puerto
Ricans in the Italian community of East Harlem resulted in
inevitable ethnic conflicts which were heightened by an ur-
ban renewal intervention that brought into the area new high-
rise low-income housing projects which were assigned to Span-
ish-speaking families and for which Italian-American residents
did not qualify since their income was just above the poverty
income level. Italian-American residents resented the impo-
sition of those projects which were perceived as the major
cause for the increased infiltration of "outsiders" into
their neighborhoods. This infiltration was considered by
the old residents as the reason for increased street crime,
the breakdown of community values and their loss of neigh-
borhood institutional control. Inevitably, Italian-Americans
lost the area which is now known as El Barrio.15
The ethnic succession play was performed once again: same
play, same roles, different actors. In the same place where
fifty years ago Italian immigrants pushed out Irish residents,
they were now being replaced by Puerto Ricans and Blacks.
Succession in ethnic neighborhoods is seen by many as a sign
of upward mobility, a guarantee for group advancement and as-
similation into the mainstream of American society. Yet we
must not forget that marginal groups always remain. They
might change names, call them Irish, Jews, Italians, Puerto
Ricans, Blacks, but there will and must always be someone to
replace them for the unfortunate reality created by social
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mobility to continue.
Among the Italian-American intellectuals who left the
neighborhood was a deep feeling of conspiracy against them.
They saw in the urban renewal project a strategy by the tech-
nocratic and political elite for creating disorder and divi-
sion in their community which resulted in their mass outmi-
gration and in their loss of political hegomony within the
community.
A similar breakdown of community cohesiveness and order
occurred in the Italian-American neighborhood of Greenwich
Village, where the expansion of New York University and the
urban renewal housing projects built in the decayed areas at
the edge of Little Italy, caused the infiltration of students
and middle-class residents into the neighborhood, and at the
same time the out-migration of working-class second and third
generation Italian-Americans. Like the North End of Boston,
the neighborhood is now becoming a prime residential area for
middle and upper income families and young professionals.
It is slowly losing its old ethnic characteristics: in fact,
corner stores, pastry shops, and groceries, etc. are being
replaced by boutiques, fancy restaurants, and art galleries.
Yet sociologists indicate another factor which has con-
tributed to the disintegration of the social order in these
communities: the impact of mass media.16 In particular,
television, which Michael Novak calls the "new melting pot,"
has been a very powerful tool controlled by the corporate/
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political elite and used to accelerate the acculturation
process of immigrants (especially for the second and third
generations), to impose values and standards on them.17 We
can say that the television replaced the settlement house in
Italian-American neighborhoods, and that the residents,
through this medium, have entered the whirl of consumption,
modernity, and conformity. Thus the role of the family, the
church, and other neighborhood institutions has been weakened
because television has been subtly advocating assimilation
and the pleasures of suburban living -- therefore outmigration.
As a result, mostly old timers clung to the neighborhood and
its traditional institutions. Those who left kept on distan-
cing their relation to the neighborhood and, in the long run,
only came back to visit old relatives or patronize ethnic
shops.
We have seen thus far how urban policies and banking prac-
tices have led to a reorganization of inner cities leading to
the deterioration of ethnic neighborhoods and, in particular,
to the out-migration of the majority of Italian-American res-
idents to suburbia. Yet, in the early seventies, attempts
were made to reverse such processes. In fact, as a result
of urban struggles during the late sixties, residents of
those mostly dormant neighborhoods have acquired a new con-
sciousness, a New Ethnicity, and their protests have definitely
contributed to the planning shifts towards preservation and
community participation in the process of economic revitaliza-
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tion of inner city neighborhoods.
While there seems to be a general consensus about the
necessity of preserving these neighborhoods, it is not clear,
in most cases, who will benefit from their revitalization and
whether the proposed programs are aimed at maintaining work-
ing-class white ethnics in the inner city, or if they are an
excuse to dismember whatever is left of old communities and
replace that social stratum with a middle-class population.
We must therefore first understand what caused the rise of the
New Ethnicity, what this new consciousness movement is all a-
bout, and who supports it. We shall defer our consideration
of the evolution of policies and programs which have been
proposed for the revitalization of Italian-American communi-
ties in New York City to the next chapter, where the issues of
neiahborhood preservation and development will be closely ana-
lyzed.
Initially, the New Ethnicity movement was a reaction of
white ethnics to threats made against their social and econ-
omic status by the Black movement and the student unrest of
the sixties. The long overdue rise of Blacks, demanding at
first access to opportunities offered by the American soci-
ety and then a "share of the power," disrupted an equilibri-
um based on unjust social relationships and thus the social,
economic and political order was bound to change. Cities
became the arena for the struggles of Blacks against injus-
tices suffered by them for centuries, and the issues of dis-
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crimination, integration, and equality of opportunity were
focused on the existing residential segregation, the control
of community schools, and access to economic opportunities.
Unfortunately, at that time, it was premature for Blacks
and ethnics to establish interracial coalitions necessary to
upset the ruling class structure and the dominant ideology.
Instead Blacks began competing for a share of power and oppor-
tunity in those areas of the economy, government, and unions
where white ethnics had made, during their past struggles,
major breakthroughs. In addition, Black demands and protests
brought about a massive expansion of welfare services which
resulted in higher taxes for white ethnics and, according
to conservatives, in inflationary trends in the economy. This
inevitably gave rise to resentment among white ethnics who saw
the new claims of Blacks not so much as an attempt to enlarge
the share of power and opportunity to all underrepresented
groups, but as a "pretentious" move (against the ethical rules
imposed on white ethnics during past decades) to take away
from them what they had gained after hard work and sacrifice.
Resentment turned to bitterness when, during the student
unrest of the late sixties, white ethnics were accused of
racism, bigotry, and provincialism and their traditional
values of family and community were questioned and rejected
by the youth of the counterculture movement. Thus white eth-
nics protested against the Blacks and the New Left accusing
them of disrupting their families and communities, and against
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the government for not also providing adequate services to the
needy in old ethnic communities and for not defending their
rights as well.
Italian-Americans were particularly sensitive to threats
made against their status during the social turmoil of the
late sixties, but their political leaders, many of whom were
militant conservatives, were unable to capture their discon-
tent and express it in the political arena. Paradoxically,
it was a well-known godfather, Joseph Colombo, who understood
the necessity for new leadership and he created the Italian
American Civil Rights League which was immediately successful
especially in New York where it has 24 neighborhood chapters. 1 8
The League was mainly interested in bringing an end to "dis-
crimination and defamatory labeling of Italian-Americans by
the conspiracy of the federal government"1 9 and in providing
new services to Italian-American neighborhoods where they
were needed by many residents. Not surprisingly:
The segment of the Italian American population
that responded to the appeal of the League was
made up of mostly persons with a $7,000 to $9,
000 yearly salary, incapable of meeting the high
taxes, the expenses for parochial school educa-
tion and for the payment of their homes with
no voice in politics and in the media.26
When 100,000 of them met on June 25, 1971 in Columbus
Circle (New York) to celebrate their Unity Day, it became
clear that a new movement was rising, one of "unmeltable
ethnics." Ironically, on that occasion, their leader Joseph
Columbo was shot by a Black, probably because of unsettled
disputes in the underworld of organized crime.21 Since then
the League has lost its initial momentum but the movement of
the new ethnics has expanded tremendously.
The vacuum of political leadership in the white ethnic
movement became an immediate public concern and suddenly maj-
or foundations made available millions of dollars for ethnic
studies and for the development of ethnic communities. Con-
servative political forces quickly exploited the vacuum and as
a consequence Nixon attracted, during the presidential elec-
tion of 1972, most of the ethnic votes.22 The cause of white
ethnics was of course used by the establishment to minimize or
counteract, through the practice of "divide and rule," the pro-
tests and demands of Blacks.
On the other hand, the massive research carried out during
the past few years by white ethnic intellectuals has certainly
been positive because it has reopened the debate on cultural
pluralism and has provided theoretical grounds for the New Eth-
nicity which has been conceived as "a form of historical con-
sciousness"2 3 that is thought to be one of the necessary con-
ditions for eliminating racism and prejudice from the American
society. At the same time, studies of ethnic communities at a
neighborhood or regional scale have provided new insights and
a better understanding of the needs and problems which white
working-class ethnics face today.
During the revived debate on pluralism and the persis-
tence of ethnicity in the American society, white ethnic
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intellectuals once again questioned the basic paradigm of
traditional sociology which indicates an evolution from
"gemeinschaft" (community) to "gesellschaft" (society) and
the paradigm of cultural assimilation.24 It was argued that
the persistence of ethnicity indicates that the evolution
from community to society never took place completely and
that American society is still made up of many subcommunities
and subcultures.25 Primary groups (family and social cliques)
are still very important for most individuals who prefer the
personal, human and intimate relationships typical of such
groups to the impersonal and formal ones typical of the
achievement-oriented secondary groups (interest groups). Eth-
nicity was seen as an inescapable human need for a "sense of
belongingness," for roots and primordial ties; ties that
for most of the ethnics "have been transmuted by the immigra-
tion experience but they have not been eliminated." 2 6 There-
fore, the assumption that Americanization crusades and educa-
tion would have, with time, abolished ethnic differences has
proven to be wrong; at most ethnic differences and ties have
been minimized.
The debate, once again, reproposed two opposing positions.
Ethnic diversity is seen as either a social asset or a danger.
Those who advocate ethnic pluralism argue that the persistence
of ethnic diversity may cause conflicts and "drawbacks," but
that it is a healthy phenomenon because as R. Dubos state: "it
creates social tensions which lead to a strenuous guest for
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attitudes and laws desiqned to aive egual rights to all citi-
zens.",27 Others see the resurgent ethnic diversity phenomenon
in our society as a "dangerous" and "regressive" trend which
should not be encouraged because "it is a return to the par-
ticularistic, the local, the tribal, and an abandonment of
the universal, the general, the global. It is a backward
step, a turn against the evolutionary flow."2 8
However, the intellectuals in favor of ethnicity know
very well that the "evolutionary flow" leads to a "supercul-
ture" based on more homogenization and social atomization, to
increased consumption and mobility, to a further profession-
alization of services, 2 9 and to an increased feeling of pow-
erlessness among individuals. This flow is categorically re-
futed by the advocates of the New Ethnicity who believe that
such a superculture is destructive, discriminatory and unjust.
Instead, they propose a new politics which will strengthen the
various ethnic subcultures and which is based on the reconstruc-
tion of family and neighborhood, the acceptance of and respect
for cultural differences and social integration. 3 0
Michael Novak, one of the theorists of the New Ethnicity,
advocates the foundation of an Ethnic Democratic Party (EDP)
which he conceives as a political institution or force which
should help to reverse the current "evolutionary flow." He
writes:
People first. Families first. Neighborhoods
first. In the last third of the twentieth century,
one can safely call upon such energies without fear
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of regression; they are the only hope of
further progress. For talented persons, women
not least, work could be most attractive if not
too rigidly scheduled, if close to home, if not
too alienating from family, neighborhood and
friends. In the old days, mothers and grand-
mothers were economically indispensable. They
worked in the fields or in the shops with men;
they canned food; they baked; they made clothes;
they delivered babies and set bones; they cared
for disturbed children; often they gave children
their primary education; they established and
governed the family budget. In our age, given the
much higher educational attainments of many men
and women in the neighborhood, the neighborhood
and home could reabsorb such tasks with far
greater competence and effect than ever before
in history. Why can't people of talent organize
for their own needs, providing for them locally?
Why can't education be aimed, not at "qualifying"
professionals, but at imparting the real skills
necessary to care for the needs of one's local
communities?
The neighborhood would put many potentials and
yearnings for satisfaction to greater use if it
reclaimed many of the functions now grabbed up --
and made fantastically expensive -- by profession-
als[... ]
Local neighborhoods have generosity and talent
to care for their own as they did since man first
walked on earth. We have so far done everything
possible to demoralize our people. We tell them
they are not "qualified." With support and en-
couragement, people could regain pride, capacity,
and competence.
The EDP is dedicated to bringing human resource-
fulness, political power, and social policy to the
organic networks of family and neighborhood. Its
every activity in organizing families, neighborhoods,
and ethnic groups is a fulfillment of its platform.
Its political success depends on bringing economic,
enabling power back to local units. Local grievances,
voiced by people themselves, are the point at which
experienced organizers begin. The large profession-
alized system around us is a bubble. Pricking it
at any point deflates its claims. 3 1
The concerns of the new ethnic policies are not just con-
fined, however, to strengthening the family and neighborhood.
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The dream of the New Ethnicity's theoreticians is breathtak-
ing. They dream of a new American society. Such an ideal-
ized society would result from policies and incentives which
would: enforce social integration and a more equitable re-
distribution of resources and income; encourage the decentral-
ization of metropolies, of productive activites, and a return
to "smallness" and human scale"; transform the present work pro-
cess based on "productivity" and "efficiency" into one "imag-
ined as part of the tissue, network, and organism of family
and growth." 3 2
Their dream also calls for a broad and inevitable coali-
tion between Blacks and ethnics: a coalition based on "mutual
respect" and an understanding of each other's needs and in-
terests; a coalition which will minimize racial conflicts and
encourage the growth of each group, not as shadows of the
superculture but as new creative forces of a new America. As
Novak states:
The new ethnic politics asks no more than a fair
deal -- but for each group, and not only for out-
standing individuals. It demands a multiform ide-
ology and culture. Not a superculture with satel-
lite subcultures, but a multiculture in which each
group supplies pivotal ideas and methods. It de-
mands that "the American way of life" be broken
open like a cocoon giving way to the burgeoning
wings of a butterfly[...]
The new ethnic politics will prove its worth if
it helps us to diminish the racial and other ten-
sions in our cities; if it gives us a larger and
more generous view of the role of families, neigh-
borhoods, and primary-group networks in the health
of social policies; and if it enables the nation to
assume a more supple and accurate relation to eth-
nic groups in other nations of the world. The super-
culture around us is declining because it seems to
have reached the limits of its creativity in pre-
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cisely those respects. 3 3
Like all dreams, the New Ethnicity of Michael Novak is too
removed from reality. My major criticism is that it idealizes
the superculture as the major oppressive force in the American
society, but does not extend its open and passionate attack
to the capitalist system which has generated the superculture
and uses it, very successfully indeed, as an instrument for
social control. Consequently, his analyses of ethnic relations
in America suffer because of the particular analytical perspec-
tive used which emphasizes ethnic rather than class stratifi-
cation. Inevitably, proposals based on the idea that an a-
wareness and acceptance of cultural roots and differences will
be sufficient to eliminate or even minimize class interests
and conflicts tend to be naive and superficial. To continue
analyzing and acting on the complex American social stratifi-
cation only from an economic perspective is deceptive. But,
at the same time, to focus mainly on cultural differences and
ethnic stratification is also unfruitful. We must not analyze
or attempt to understand ethnicity and social classes as sep-
arate phenomena, but rather we must see them in dynamic in-
teraction.34 Thus far, this interplay has not been properly
explored and research should be encouraged to understand the
extent to which class and ethnic stratifications are interde-
pendent and most importantly to analyze how the ruling class
uses ethnic fragmentation to minimize class struggle in
America.
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Notwithstanding all its naiveties and shortcomings, the
dream of a New Ethnicity has increased the level of conscious-
ness and militancy amont the ethnic population. New ethnic
interest groups began lobbying for resources to be allocated
to their constituencies. During the past few years, the gov-
ernment and private (corporate) sectors responded positively
to such demands and seem to have formally accepted the idea
of cultural pluralism. The questions now are: how are the
resources used? How is the formal acceptance of cultural
pluralism translated into policies? Will the new policies
result in a reversal of the "evolutionary flow" or have the
corporate and political elite found a way to incorporate into
their logic, and therefore to exploit, the ideas brought for-
ward by the New Ethnicity theoreticians? Which resources
finally reach ethnic neighborhoods and how are the new preser-
vation policies affecting them?
"Politics begins in dream and ends in bureaucrats"35 writes
Novak, and he is certainly right when we think of what hap-
pened to the New Ethnicity dream. The sudden interest of the
public and private sectors in Ethnicity has resulted in a
bureaucratization, professionalization and-exploitation of
the phenomenon.
Congress, in 1972, enacted the Ethnic Heritage Studies
Act which provided grants and incentives for the development
of curriculum materials and for comparative studies to under-
stand the experience of ethnic groups in America. 6 These
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resources never reached the ethnic neighborhoods and their
residents. They remained at an elite level. They were
mainly used by universities, small colleges and community
schools to set up progr.ams for ethnic studies and bilingual
programs. Even though there were intellectual repercussions,
the most tangible outcome of such programs has been the em-
ployment of upper and middle class ethnics in educational
institutions and the reduction of the ethnic experience to
the contemplative realm. The institutionalization of the
New Ethnicity has neutralized whatever revolutionary poten-
tial was implicit in the dream, as it had done for the Black
and feminist movements. Black Studies, Women's Studies,
Ethnic Studies, everything is studied and professionalized,
but little is acted upon! However, even if this is a new form
of co-option and control by the dominant ideology, subversive
possibilities still exist for those militant ethnics who are
able to use the educational framework for authentic conscious-
ness raising and organizing.
In addition to the resources available through the Ethnic
Heritage Studies Act, certain federal agencies and private
foundations (Ford, Rockefeller) made funds available to eth-
nic organizations such as the New York Center for Ethnic Af-
fairs, the Institute on Pluralism and Group Identity to carry
out quantitative research on white ethnics. These studies
have first of all statistically demonstrated that ethnic com-
munities in metropolitan areas are indeed disadvantaged with
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respect to the income, employment, and educational status of
their population, and have also indicated that there have been
patterns of discrimination against ethnics in terms of social
mobility and acceptance. 37
Leaders of the various ethnic groups have used the results
of such studies to lobby for additional resources. Given the
purposely limited amount of resources made available, the re-
sult is that competitive mechanisms have been set up among the
various ethnic and minority (Blacks, Puerto Rican) groups.
This limited availability of resources is a strategy used by
the system to prevent the economic and social advancement of
the above-mentioned groups and to assure, through competition,
that no coalition will materialize among white ethnics and
Blacks.
Ethnicity has been used by the private sector, through the
mass media, to increase consumption. Industries pretend that
they have accepted ethnic pluralism as manifested in their
differentiation of products (but not of the production pro-
cess) and in their adoption of ethnic symbolism. The "ethni-
cization" of the product is not an acceptance of ethnicity
and of what the ethnic dream implied since the production pro-
cess is still a capitalist one. "Volare" is still Chrysler and
the assembly line, "Hunt's Prima Salsa" is still the corporate
owned canned food with additives and artificial flavors pro-
duced on a conveyor belt.
Politics, in particular the recent presidential campaign,
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has exploited "ethnicity" in order to win votes. Both Jimmy
and Jerry have praised and promised the preservation of eth-
nic heritage and cultural pluralism in America. This rhetor-
ic may appeal to many ethnics for it gives them the illusion
that cultural diversity is now accepted as "American" and
therefore that they (usually working-class) are an integrated
part of American life and society. The ethnic factor becomes
a clever political strategy for avoiding the real issues as-
sociated with immigrant working-class enclaves. As Ellen
Goodman has pointed out: "the appeal to the 'ethnic vote'[...]
helps the candidates avoid mentioning a no-no like the class
structure of a society, or even using the phrase 'working
class,' let alone white working class." 3 8
Politicians also praise and romanticize ethnic neighbor-
hoods. Thev talk about the need to preserve them while occul-
ting what they have really been. But is preservation to be
more than the commericialization of an ethnic neighborhood and
its subsequent transformation into a tourist attraction as
has been the case, for example, of Little Italy in New York?
Is cultural heritage to become but a mere component of the
consumptive whirl? Religious festas, once an occasion for
community celebration, are now fun fairs or amusement parks
for surburbanites and students. Most neighborhood restaurants,
with their high prices, can only cater to an elitist clientele.
Yet, for the working-class neighborhood residents, there is
always a Mac Donald's down the street, open to all, where the
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prices are cheap and where they can learn about and appreciate
the efficiency of highly productive capitalist food production.
Ethnic neighborhood preservation, as it will be analyzed
in the case study of the next chapter, has thus far been char-
acteristically "piecemeal" and often poorly coordinated. As
a result, the scarce resources from different public programs
have been channelled into particular neighborhoods while oth-
ers are left to disintegrate. While cities are waiting for
the presidential promises to materialize and hope that the
National Neighborhood Policy Act, proposed by Senator Proxmire
and now pending in Congress,34 will provide a more comprehen-
sive planning framework and the resources necessary for the
revitalization of all inner city working-class districts, at-
tempts are being made by some ethnic organizations to deal with
the pressing problems of several ethnic neighborhoods.
The National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs in Washington,
D.C. is one of the largest non-profit organizations concerned
with the preservation and revitalization of ethnic neighbor-
hoods. Its director, Monsignor Geno Baroni, is another pas-
sionate advocate of the New Ethnicity. Contrary to many oth-
er ethnics who limit their field of action to writing and
teaching, Monsignor Baroni is a firm believer in practice.
He argues that the new wave of Ethnicity can bring about major
social changes within the framework of democratic process and
public policy:
The ethnic factor in America today is a quiet
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revolution of consciousness aimed at creating
a new pluralism. It is sparked by an untenable
economic situation and by indignation at having
been alternately ignored and castigated by the
establishment. It is a revolution of self as-
sertion that will utilize new techniques of com-
munity participation, community organization, com-
munity development, and legislative action to
make power felt at the polls. 4 0
Baroni's attitudes toward the revitalization of ethnic
neighborhoods is not based on dreams or radical social changes,
but on concrete programs aimed at first reconstructing the
social fabric of the neighborhood and its institutions, and
then at revitalizing the physical and economic development of
the area. For example, Baroni advocates a new role for the
ethnic parishes:
The parish must revitalize the neighborhood not
only around the altar where we are one in the
unity of the eucharist, but the parish must de-
velop a new sense of community development. The
parish must become a catalyst for revitalizing
neighborhoods in order to help them with rapid
social change.41
Baroni also encourages the development of a new kind of lead-
ership in the ethnic ommunities which should deal specifically
with local issues and seek the stabilization of the neighbor-
hoods by developing appropriate social and economic policies.
Baroni's ideas have won the consensus of the United States
Catholic Conference and of major foundations which have pro-
vided the NCUEA with funds necessary for initiating neighbor-
hood revitalization programs in more than thirty cities (43
ethnic communities) and other research projects in 87 neigh-
borhoods. During the past few years, the NCUEA has offered
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the following services and resources to needy ethnic commun-
ities: 1) provision of seed money and training programs for
the development of local leadership 2) development, through
the organizing of the communities, of revitalization programs
which reflect local needs and problems; 3) development of
strategies to coordinate the public, private, and community
sectors involved in the revitalization programs.42
The NCUEA has suggested a general program for Neighborhood
Economic Revitalization which has the following objectives:
1. To increase the new cash flow into the neigh-
berhood, including public and private capi-
tal investment.
2. To reduce patterns of disinvestment in neighbor-
hood businesses and real estate.
3. To stimulate the environmental preconditions
to profitable business operations in the
neighborhoods, such as adequate facilities,
public safety, public transportation, parking
and zoning.43
4. To restore commercial life to the neighbor-
hood, primarily by improving the mix of retail
goods and services, strengthening its competitive
position, and building a positive image based on
the unique cultural and ethnic characteristics
of the neighborhood.
5. To acquire and develop medium scale manufactur-
ing enterprises that are labor-intensive.
6. To develop real estate by improving the housing
and physical conditions of the neighborhood.
7. To provide management and technical assistance
to local entrepreneurs and businesses. 4 4
To provide the initial funding, the NCUEA has proposed
that the Local Business Development Organization (LBDO) pro-
gram of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) and
other federal programs be expanded to also serve white ethnic
communities. While the implementation of such programs in
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some white ethnic neighborhoods is still at its initial stage,
we can most likely forsee its development by retrospectively
considering the experiences of Black community development
projects funded by the same federal agencies and whose revit-
alization programs were similar, if not identical to the ones
proposed by the NCUEA.
Many of the enterprises and programs initiated by Community
Development Corporations (CDCs) and LBDOs in Black qhettos
have had little success or have failed mainly because of their
dependence on outside investors. Not only has there been a
significant gap between what has been promised and what is
actually delivered to Black communities, but (and this is
especially true for the private corporate sector) what is de-
livered is aimed at profit-making at the expense of the com-
munity. This reliance on and control by outside investors
not only deprives the community control of cash flow which is
the most important tool for future economic development in the
community and for the provision of services to residents, but
also prevents the community from having a participatory man-
agement of its economic institutions.
Because of the constraints imposed on the community ven-
tures by outside investors and by the economic system in gen-
eral, the work and decision-making processes have remained
hierarchical. The few Black community residents who have
succeeded in becoming technicians or sometimes even managers,
have been co-opted by the capitalist system which establishes
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a division and distinction between bosses and workers and
which uses the strategy of social mobility to justify it. A
few "make it" but it is again (although within the community
this time) at the expense of the group. It is now Black cap-
italism. Undoubtedly, the CDC monitored programs have some-
times resulted in a better standard of living (additional jobs,
job training, services, etc.) but the quality of life remains
pretty much the same. A feeling of powerlessness still pre-
vades most of the residents who remain alienated from the
decision making processes affecting their daily lives.
The programs for the revitalization of white ethnic neigh-
borhoods are also dependent on the organizational framework
provided by the CDCs and if community residents do not define
and articulate their group interests and do not continuously
search for participatory decision-making processes, then they
are headed for an "ethnic" brand of capitalism.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS AND PLANNING PROCESSES FOR THE
PRESERVATION OF ITALIAN-AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS IN NYC
"Citizen involvement is a reality. History has clearly
shown us that the only choice is to work with the com-
munities -- or they will work against us[ ... ]"
(John Zuccotti)
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The 1970 Census findings confirmed that the complaints of
white ethnics during the late sixties were not founded on ra-
cism, as the media and intellectuals had claimed, but on jus-
tified resentment due to the economic squeeze they were facing.
The findings, which surprised many, cast shadows on the theory
of ethnic succession, for if it was true that Blacks, Puerto
Ricans, and other minorities had taken the places of white
ethnics in certain inner city districts of New York, it was
not true, on the other hand, that Italian-Americans and oth-
er ethnics were all quickly moving up the social mobility
ladder. Many Italian-Americans and other white ethnics of
New York were, in terms of income, educational attainment and
jobs, still within the poverty bracket and, not surprisingly,
were still living in ethnic enclaves.
The Census findings indicated that Italian-Americans, the
largest ethnic group of New York City (1.7 million), had the
largest percentage of poor of all white ethnic groups; in
fact, the level of poverty of first and second generation
Italian-Americans was close to that of Blacks. Approximately
400,000 (23%) of them earned less than $4,300 annually as
opposed to 37% of the Blacks and 14% of all white ethnics.
Poverty was particularly high among the aged who lived in the
enclaves: 22% of the Italian-Americans in New York were over
62 and 80% of them were poor and did not receive appropriate
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public assistance. Compared with other white ethnic groups,
Italian-Americans were the lowest in educational attainment
with the highest drop-out rate and youth unemployment level.
Similarly, Italian-Americans had the highest percentage of un-
skilled laborers and the lowest percentage of professionals,
managers, and administrators.1
In light of these findings, the Federal Office of Econ-
omic Opportunity and the city's Human Resources Administration
decided to review the existing antipoverty programs and extend
to needy white ethnics those services restricted until then to
minorities. Some two million dollars were made available to
study the problems of ethnic communities in the city and to
initiate programs for the stabilization and revitalization of
the various ethnic neighborhoods. Mayor Lindsay and the city's
H.R.A. invited new city-wide coalitions of Italian, Irish,
Jewish, Greek and Chinese groups to submit proposals and pro-
grams for their communities.2
Representatives of 26 Italian-American groups quickly
formed an "umbrella organization," the Italian-American Co-
alition of the City of New York, whose purpose, as stated in
its constitution bylaws, was:
To establish, through the association of repre-
sentative organizations, a coordinative struc-
ture beneficial to each member; to harmonize for
the benefit of all the expertise or specialty of
each member; to direct the collective thinking
and efforts of all toward the promotion of equal-
ity, justice and fair play in all fields affect-
ting our people and all people; to encourage Ital-
ian-American advancement everywhere within the frame-
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work of the American way of life; and to assist
each member in the furtherance of its respective
goals and of this purpose. 3
The Italian-American Coalition immediately submitted a
proposal for the funding of another organization, which was
to be its technical and policy making branch, to the U.S.
Office of Economic Opportunity. The executive director of
the Coalition, Dr. Joseph Valletutti, states that this new
organization, called the Italian-American Center for Urban
Affairs, was "created by deeply dedicated and altruistic
men and women who have been serving the Italian-American com-
munity of this city for many years in many capacities -- in
public, private, political, educational, cultural and business
sectors of this community. 4 The purposes of the Center were:
a. To provide for and promote the general better-
ment and improvement of the cultural, social
and physical well being of the individuals of
Italian-American heritage.
b. To aid and to assist individuals of Italian-
American heritage in their efforts to over-
come the ills caused by ignorance, discrimin-
ation, intolerance, bigotry and exclusion
preventing their pursuit of happiness and ful-
fillment as members of society.
c. To undertake study and research into the nature,
extent and depth of the problems confronting
individuals of Italian-American heritage in
all aspects of their environments and to promote,
create and initiate methods and programs to
combat these problems.
d. To develop programs responsive to the needs of
the Italian-American community, to utilize
existing resources and develop resources when
and where needed to meet these needs. 5
For such generalized, abstract, and rhetorically expressed
goals, the Italian-American Center for Urban Affairs promptly
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received $75,000 from the Federal Office of Economic Opportun-
ity and $15,000 from the Pope Foundation, and was incorpora-
ted in July 1972 as a not for profit corporation, type B.6
In October 1972, the IACUA submitted an impressive sound-
ing proposal to the Human Resources Administration asking for
$318,380 to fund its future programs and projects. The pro-
posal called for the development of a centralized administra-
tion within the IACUA which would "incorporate the functions
of community participation and information dissemination,
program development and program operation, monitoring infor-
mation systems and reporting."7 The Center was to plan a
city wide neighborhood stabilization program and coordinate
the establishment of a Neighborhood Stabilization Council in
each of six selected Italian-American communities in New York
City. The centralized administration of the IACUA was also
to be responsible for all major reserach, policy statements,
and program development in each of those communities, and
would represent them in their negotiations with city, state,
and federal agencies. The Neighborhood Stabilization Councils
composed of bilingual social workers, would instead be respon-
sible for the delivery of a long list of social services ad-
ministrated through the IACUA: housing, economic development,
manpower, youth development, education, senior citizens aid,
day care aid, health services, welfare intake services, im-
migrant orientation program, etc. Yes, the whole bag!
The proposal was approved by the HRA which decided to
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grant IACUA $270,000 and, at the same time, rejected a request
for $10,000 submitted by CIAO (The Congress of Italian Amer-
ican Organizations), a grass roots organization which, since
1965, had been helping the residents of deteriorating Italian-
American communities in New York. But who were those "deeply
dedicated and altruistic men and women" of the Italian American
Coalition and IACUA? Writing for the Village Voice, Jack New-
field states:
The Coalition is a strange group with a strange
history. Its chairman is Dominic Massaro, a Rock-
efeller appointee to the staff of the State Commis-
sion of Human Rights. Its vice-chairman is Congress-
man Mario Biaggi. Its executive director is Dr.
Joseph Valletutti. Dr. Valletutti got his "Dr."
tittle, which is actually an hororary degree in com-
mercial science," by raising enough money in a Thurs-
day night bingo game on Queens Boulevard to endow a
chair at St. John's University. St. John's in re-
turn gave Valletutti his honorary title of "doctor
of commercial science."
Two other influential supporters of the Coalition
are the recently indicted Nat Narcone of the Italian-
American Civil Rights League and Manhattan Surrogate
Sam Di Falco [also recently indicted during the judge-
ship sale scandal in N.Y.].
[Of the original $75,000 OEO grant] $40,000 of
that money went into furnishing a garish office at
104 East 40th Street. The office contains zebra-
striped sofas, wall-to-wall carpeting, a bar, and a
stereo. None of the money went to poor Italians, or
to hire organizers, or to start programs for the
people who live in Carona, or Belmont, or in the
South Village.
About $30,000 of the original OEO grant went to
a very slick managment consultant company called
Raven Reserach on West 76th Street. The slick con-
sultants wrote a formula proposal for a grant, pro-
mising many wonderful things the Italian-American
Coalition would do.9
Yet, notwithstanding the above accusations, the Italian-
American Coalition and its policy making branch, the IACUA,
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managed to receive funds for another three and a half years
of operation. As could be expected, during this period the
IACUA has accomplished very little; only a handful of small
publications of statistical and historical data about Italian
Americans has appeared, and all the beautiful promises which
were made in their slick proposal have remained promises.
Soon, conflicts developed within the Coalition and its few
honest and well-intentioned members dropped out. The Coalition
never became a service agency; it remained a mere "paper organ-
ization" controlled by conservative politicians. Last spring
it moved from its plush East 40th Street office to a church
basement: it awaits new funds.
Like many other ethnic organizations, the IACUA and Co-
alition ended up providing for upper middle-class ethnic pro-
fessionals and did almost nothing for the needy in the Italian-
American communities. It is ironic to note that the IACUA re-
mained virtually unknown to residents of Italian-American neigh-
borhoods. Yet one must not only condemn the ethnic profession-
als for such tactics, but also city and federal agencies for
granting funds to such an organization rather than searching
for more appropriate local grass-roots organizations. These
professionals were from outside the neighborhoods, were not
neighborhood based and supported and therefore could be more
easily co-opted and controlled by the city. This evidently
could have greatly influenced city and federal decisions to
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fund such people and such an organization rather than a more
potentially effective community-based one.
The receptivity of city and federal agencies to such a
beautifully written grant proposal as IACUA's, loaded with all
sorts of claims and promises, raises crucial questions about
criteria adopted in evaluating grant eligibility. Did this
intermediary organization receive funds because it was seen as
easily co-optable? Did it have the proper respectability and
credentials, in a pre-established, conservative sense? Was it
the manner in which the IACUA requests were expressed; was
grantmanship the name of the game?
In addition, was the IACUA incident an isolated case or,
as I fear, a phenomenon common to other ethnic intermediate
organizations which have perhaps been able to better disguise
or conceal their tactics and lack of accomplishments? Are in-
termediary organizations the best or only way to deal with
ethnic communities? What other possibilities exist? Inter-
mediaries are problematic but can they be eliminated? Such
questions and issues, some of which will be dealt with in
the next chapter, remain to be answered and resolved.
Although the Italian American Coalition failed to initiate
programs for revitalizaing Italian-American communities, New
York City's politicians and officials seemed committed to new
programs and processes for stabilizaing decaying neighborhoods
and developing their qualities. For a city like New York,
this was a drastic change in attitude which implied leaving
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unrealized most, if not all, of the proposals included in the
monumental Plan for New York City published in 1969. In May
1973, the city mayor, in an executive order, declared that
"[the] preservation of city neighborhoods is critically im-
portant to the welfare of all the people of the City of New
York and must be given highest priority among government
actions[ .. ] 10
This commitment, which resulted from the insistent cri-
ticism against urban renewal programs and centralized plan-
ning, must be seen as an integral part of the efforts made
to more effectively involve neighborhood residents in the
planning process. As John Zuccotti, then chairman of the
New York Planning Commission, testified before the State Char-
ter Revision Commission for NYC on March 30, 1973:
[...]In sum, I will be speaking about the re-
distribution of power, so that local matters can
be decided in and with the community[...]Citizen
involvement is a reality. History has clearly
shown us that the only choice is to work with the
communities -- or they will work against us[...]"
In practice, the above was translated into a reinforcement
of the Community Boards1 2 and in a shift from "Master Planning"
to "Miniplanning." Miniplanning has been used by the city to
"tailor" the planning process to the needs of particular areas
or communities which have special historical, environmental
or ethnic qualities.
The occasion for experimenting the miniplan approach with
the entire community was provided in the early spring of 1974
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when the residents of Little Italy, in the Lower East Side of
Manhattan, picketed a site in the heart of the neighborhood
where a new schoold for 1200 students, P.S. 21, was going to
be built. Residents of Little Itlay were worried about the
continuous infiltration of the Chinese population into what
they considered their neighborhood and feared that the new
school would serve and reinforce the Chinese community more
than the Italian-American residents, who instead were in se-
vere need of housing and health services. Leaders of the com-
munity legally succeeded in halting the construction of the
school and began to dialogue first with the Borough President,
Percy Sutton, and then with the chairman of the City Planning
Deparmtent, John Zuccotti, who eventually committed his agency
to initiating a study to understand the unmet needs of this
ethnic community and to plan for its future development.
The leaders of little Italy were determined to defend and
reinforce the Italian-American character of the neighborhood
for, in the past decade, it has been weakened by the new mul-
ti-ehtnic compostion of the community. In Little Italy, live
approximately 18,000 people of whom 46% are Italian-Americans
while 49% are Chinese and the remaining 15% Puerto Ricans
and Dominicans.13 The Italian is the oldest of the three
ethnic groups but is declining since its young third generation
has been moving into suburban areas. The business base of the
neighborhood is also becoming multi-ethnic; in fact, one sees
more and more Chinese stores along Mulberry and Mott Streets
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intermingled with Italian restaurants, religious associations,
and social clubs. Canal Street and the Bowery, which histor-
ically have been the boundaries separating the three ethnic
groups, are no longer dividing lines. Spanish and Chinese
speaking families are invading Little Italy: renting apart-
ments, buying properties, opening stores and cultural centers.
The decayed areas surrounding Little Italy are also under-
going major transformations. It is likely that the Lower East
and West Sides will become a middle-class residential area
with ethnic food districts to give it flavor. On the Lower
East Side, the old tenements are being bought by middle-class
Puerto Ricans and other private investors. Chinatown, because
of Hong Kong investors, is also undergoing major economic de-
velopment. These changes are bound to have an effect on the
land value, rent levels, and economic base of Little Italy.
The City Planning Commission decided to tackle the dynamic
and interconnected situation evolving in the Lower East and
West Sides by initiating three separate miniplans; first for
Little Italy, then for Chinatown and Case Espera.nza, and
finally for So-Ho. These plans were to eventually lead to the
revisions of existing zoning and the creation of three "Spe-
cial District" legislations. It was decided that the Little
Itlay miniplan would be developed by the Urban Design Group,
of the City Planning Commission, in consultation with the
Little Italy Restoration Association, LIRA (MONEY!), a grass-
roots (or so they claim) community organization initially
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created for surfacing the needs of the neighborhood.
John Zucotti attached much importance to the Little Itlay
project (employees of the Planning Commission refer to it as
Zuccotti's "pet project") saying: "This is a new field for
us [.. . it isn't just preserving a street or a building. It's
an attempt to preserve an atmosphere, to give an area a cultur-
al and spiritual flavor, ,15 and added that, if successfully
carried out, such an experiment would automatically become pro-
to-type for other ethnic neighborhood stabilization and revi-
talization projects.
The draft of the plan was made available to Italian commun-
ity leaders at the beginning of the summer of 1974. It was
subsequently purged: relevant information such as the hetero-
geneity of the neighborhood was purposely omitted from the re-
port. Finally, on September 19, 1974 at a press conference,
the plan was made public and called the "Risorgimento"16 Plan.
It was presented as a framework for action and as "the initial
result of a partnership with the community that must be tested
in the community. ,17 The proposals, however, were very pre-
cise and suggestive of a new neighborhood image. In particular,
the "Risorgimento" called for the following programs:
1. Upgrading housing by means of selective re-
habilitation and new infill housing, notably
a joint housing/school project on the P.S. 21
site.
2. Pedestrianizaing the major commercial strips
and beautifying streets.
3. Rehabilitating and expanding the existing open
space facilities.
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4. Expanding the commercial base by attracting
new businesses.
5. Preserving and restoring historic storefronts
and landmarks.
6. Creating an Italian-American Cultural Center
to be housed, upon rehabilitation, in the old
Police Headquarters.
7. Expanding community social services.
The underlying assumption of the "Risorcimento" was that
Little Italy, undoubtedly a low income, multi-ethnic decaying
neighborhood, had to become a "city-wide" and regional re-
source, "a teaming tourist attraction[... ] a place of great
food and spectacular festivals. ,18 The plan emphasizes such
a characteristic by proposing a new image which would trans-
form the neighborhood into a middle-class residential area
with a major pedestrianized "regional spine," where commercial
resources of one ethnic group (Italian-American) would be con-
centrated. The flavor would remain Italian with outdoor caffe,
new "piazze," new "trattorie" and an Italian-American Cultur-
al Center, the first of its kind in New York City and probably
in the United States.
This new image undermines not only the multi-ethnic char-
acter of the neighborhood but also its heterogeneous economic
base which is now very prosperous, but controlled mainly by
the Chinese and outsiders, as was indicated in the following:
1. Despite its residential and retail char-
acter, Little Italy is a high density in-
dustrial area, employing some 5,000 people
in 30 blocks.
2. The industrial and manufacturing firms are con-
centrated on Mulberry and Mott Streets, where
firms are also found above restaurants and
ethnic shops.
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3. Of the 130 ethnic retail storefronts, two-
thirds are characterized as Italian and one-
third as Chinese.19
4. The Chinese own approximately 50% of the estate
and manufacturing firms in the southern part
of the neighborhood.
While the "Risorgimento" plan, through the pedestrianization
of a commercial strip such as Mulberry Street, would, on the
one hand, favor the establishment and expansion of restau-
trants and ethnic shops; it would, on the other hand, pres-
sure industrial and manufacturing firms located there to
move out of the neighborhood, and as a result there would be
a significant loss of jobs for the community.
The "Risorgimentb" proposals were enthusiastically re-
ceived by the press as well as by the Italian-American com-
munity. Il Progresso, the most important Italian-American
newspaper, saluted them as "L'ultimo miracolo di S. Gennaro"
(St. Gennaro's latest miracle)! The Sunday News echoed: "A
renaissance for Little Italy. A strollers' delight." The
Italian-American residents of Little Italy were also enthu-
siastic about the "Risorgimento" although most of them saw it
from an entirely different point of view. One resident com-
mented" "Beautiful, beautiful. The more Italian people in the
ares, the better the area. ,80 Anne Compoccia, president of
the St. Anne Society of the Most Precious Blood Church, de-
clared: "I think it's a very good idea. Fir the first time
in many years Little Italy is showing a unity that we need in
the area to combat the growing infiltration of other nation-
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alities. ,21
The community leaders and city officials, however, were
suave and compromising on this issue. T. Tarantini, execu-
tive director of LIRA, pointed out: "There is no discrimin-
ation involved here. Little Italy will always be a mixed
neighborhood. We want it that way. We just want to preserve
the character of the area, and, frankly, in recent years the
erosion has been severe. ,22 And elsewhere he says:
The Chinese and the Italians are very similar.
Both groups are family oriented; both have a
strong work ethic. The Chinese came here in
the same way as the Italians -- through the
padrone system, where someone sponsors you
and you owe your life to them. Italians are
very sensitive to those circumstances.2 3
Zuccotti, when questioned if strengthening the Italian
flavor of Little Italy would imply a "rebuff" to the Chinese
residents, promptly replied:
Absolutely not. We regard both of these com-
munities as valuable to the city and we intend
to improve both of them. Any upgrading of social
services, housing and health facilities on the
Lower East Side will benefit both Italians and
Chinese. And let's not forget that Little Italy
is no longer monolithic -- it now has a substan-
tial Hispanic and Chinese population.2 4
In the plan, however, there is no provision for joint manage-
ment (Italian, Chinese, Spanish) of the housing projects, nor
is there a guarantee that residents would not be squeezed out
of their apartments if demand for housing in the area were to
increase.
To carry out the programs as outlined in the "Risorgimen-
Regional Context of Little Italy,
Little Italy
N.Y.
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LITTLE ITALY 1970: CENSUS OF POPULATION - AGE GROUPS/RACE
Age Group CT CT Total41 43
Total Population 9,294 5,104 14,398
Age Group 0-19 934 475 1,409
" 20-34 1,028 464 1,492
" 35-54 2,314 1,357 3,671
" 55-64 1,865 1,321 3,186
" 65 and over 2,953 1,486 4,439
Race
Italians 3,367 2,525 5,892
Puerto Rican 746 1,596 2,272
and Dominican
Chinese 4,930 468 5,398
F-1)
LITTLE ITALY 1970: TYPE OF FAMILY
Census Tract
41 43
All Families [husband-wife, male
head, female head]
With own children
No. of children
Families without Children
Relationship to Head of Household
All Persons
In Households
Head of Household
Head of Family
In Group Quarters
Persons per Household
Residence in 1965
Persons 5 years and over
Same House as in 1970
Different House
Abroad
2,225
1,065
2,333
2.1 child.
1,161
9,294
8,911
3,028
2,225
383
2.94
8,718
5,800
884
1,362
1,145
565
1,221
2.1
580
5,104
4,585
1,710
1,145
519
2.68
4,708
2,710
606
766
o
LITTLE ITALY 1970: INCOME CHARACTERISTICS -- FAMILIES AND
UNRELATED CHARACTERISTICS
Census Tract Census Tract
41 43
All Families 2,207 1,128
Less than 1,000 125 66
1,000 - 1,999 161 66
2,000 - 2,999 170 88
3,000 - 3,999 167 115
4,000 - 4,999 211 78
5,000 - 5,999 213 117
6,000 - 6,999 215 81
7,000 - 7,999 141 144
8,000 - 8,999 161 85
9,000 - 9,999 107 57
10,000 -11,999 244 78
12,000 -14,999 125 52
15,000 -24,999 144 76
25,000 -49,999 18 10
50,000 or more 5 5
Median Income $6,263 $6,420
Mean Income 7,137 7,424
Unrelated Individuals 1,242 1,182
Median Income $2,880 $2,716
Mean Income $3,296 $3,579
I-I
1.0
LITTLE ITALY 1970: INCOME CHARACTERISTICS -- FAMILIES AND
UNRELATED CHARACTERISTICS
Census Tract Census Tract
41 43
Income Below Poverty Level
Families
% of all families
% of public assistance income
Mean Size of Family
Mean # of Related Children
Under 18
Family Heads
Percent 65 years and over
Unrelated Individuals
Percent of all Unrelated
Individuals
Mean Income
Mean Income Deficit
Percent 65 years and over
514
23.2
16.7
3.40
2.36
514
30.7
471
37.9
$760
$1,077
51.8
241
21.4
24.5
3.72
2.36
241
19.1
490
41.5
$729
$1,178
21.4
Households (no owner-renter occupied) 852
Mean Gross Rent $69
H_
456
$70
141
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LITTLE ITALY 1970: OCCUPANCY, UTILIZATION AND FINANCIAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSING UNITS
Housing Units Census Tract Census 
Tract
41 43
All Housing Units 3,136 1,772
Owner Occupied 38 19
Cooperative and Condominium -- --
Renter Occupied 2,980 1,691
White 1,525 1,397
Negro 52 105
Vacant Year Round 108 60
Median Rent Asked $48 $63
Lacking Some or All Plumbing Facilities
All Units 471 80
Lacking Complete Kitchen Facilities 116 29
Access Only Through Other Living
Quarters 30 5
Rooms: Median 3.1 3.2
Persons: Median (All Occupied Units) 2.5 2.3
Units with Roomer, Boarder, Lodger 52 41
Year Structure Built
60-64 17 9
50-59 42 18
40-49 58 140
1939 or earlier 3,019 1,596
All Occupied Housing Units 3,028 1,710
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LITTLE ITALY 1975: FIRMS BY INDUSTRY
Total # of Firms # of Firms Percent of
Industry Firms South of North of Firms
Broome St. Broome St.
Apparel 71 48 23 22.6%
Printing 25 8 17 7.9%
Wholesale 37 13 24 11.8%
Metal Products (mfg) 21 10 11 6.7%
Automotive 5 0 5 1.6%
Food Processing 10 5 5 3.2%
Services (Contractors, 14 5 9 4.5%
repairs)
Other Manufacturing 17 6 11 5.4%
miscellaneous1 114 81 33 36.3%
TOTAL 314 176 138 100.0%
1Con Edison, Canal Street and Bowery Jewelers
H-
LITTLE ITALY 1975: EMPLOYMENT BY
Total Employment Employment 'Industry's
Industry Employ- South of North of Percentage
ment Broome St. Broome St. of Employment
Apparel (mfg) 2667 2187 480 56.2%
Printing 162 49 113 3.4%
Wholesale 279 118 161 5.9%
Metal Products (mfg) 193 142 51 4.1%
Automotive 16 0 16 0.3%
Food Processing 126 99 27 2.7%
Services (Contractors, 251 94 157 5.3%
repairs)
Other Manufacturing 166 60 106 3.5%
Miscellaneous1  885 678 207 18.6%
TOTAL 4745 3427 1318 100.0%
1 Con Edison, Canal Street
Uq
INDUSTRY
and Bower Jewelers
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Architects rendering of Proposed Housing/School site on corner of Mott and
Spring Street
Artist rendering of rehahilitated De Salvio Park on Spring F fulberry St.
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Proposed Cultural Center
Former Police Headquarters
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to," The Commission of City Planning recommended the establish-
ment of a community based development corporation and it was
suggested that LIRA "might serve as the nucleus of such a
corporation "25 Subsequently, LIRA was officially awarded
a contract by the Housing and Development Administration. Its
task was to gather detailed information about the housing con-
ditions in the neighborhood, to propose a general rehabilita-
tion plan necessary for preserving the character of the neigh-
borhood, to coordinate the efforts of private parties, and
eventually to control housing development in the area.26
However, the contract between HDA and LIRA was only a
means for providing this organization with expense funds. In-
stead of carrying out its initial tasks, LIRA concentrated
mainly on the implementation of the proposed Mulberry Street
Mall, while the Urban Design Group was preparing the "special
district" plan which should have been enacted by the fall of
of 1975. Yet, as of today, not much has happened. The Mall
has not been successfully implemented and the approval of
the special district legislation has been postponed sine
die. 27
The highly publicized and prototypical Mulberry Street
Mall has remained the dream of a few. Mulberry Street is
still as it was, jammed with cars, crowded, alive, pictur-
esque as the residents have made it, as they perhaps really
wanted it to be. When the residents want to close the
street, it happens. But it happens in their own way, with
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a participative disorder like the one during the chaotic and
stressing days of the S. Gennaro festival. Why is that so?
After all, the pedestrianization plan, provided by the UDG,
had been well-studied and outlined. The outdoor space al-
located to each caffe was carefully calculated; new banners
were designed to beautify the street and their location was
studied to preserve the street perspective and to respect
the existing fire codes; new standards were studied for more
humane street furniture. Tables, umbrellas, flower pots, and
banners were all provided with a grant from the Rockefeller
Foundation ($30,000).
Yet, when the day came to open the Mall (Phase II),
there were on the street only a few people and still quite a
few cars (the owners did not want to move them). The street
had lost its liveliness. The people, the crowds of the S.
Gennaro festivals, were not there: only Chinese children
were playing in the streets while a few old Italian-American
residents gathered around the new mural, at the corner of
Canal Street. This mural features photos of the neighbor-
hood landmarks and a sterile message form UDG saying: "Know
your neighborhood." An angry Italian-American resident was
shouting: "Why they did not put up a picture of the Most
Precious Blood Church? It's our church. Why isn't it up
there?" Others, shopkeepers, refused to take down the small
green-white-red flags they had put up a long time before; in-
furiating in that way Ms. Raquel Ramati, UDG director, who
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was arguing that the flags had to come down because they
disturbed the street perspective and bacause the new banners
advertising the Rockefeller Family Fund, Fiat, Alitalia, etc.
were not clearly visible! The shopkeepers, on the other hand,
were arguing that their flags had always been there and they
would only take them down when the S. Gennaro festival d.ecor-
ations would go up. So the artist's rendering of the "pedon-
alizzazione," prepared by the UDG, representing joyful people
sitting in an orderly fashion "al fresco" and sipping a "cap-
puccino," remained only an artist's vision and the Mulberry
Street Mall.. .a fiasco.
The Mall fiasco was, in my opinion, due to the city's in-
ability to resolve local conflicts regarding the proposed
pedestrianization and to effectively involve the community in
a participatory planning process. Local residents and bus-
inessmen had been divided over the issue of the Mall: many
thought that their businesses or the neighborhood in general
would benefit from such a change, others feared that the elim-
ination of parking space would result in a loss of customers
and out-of-town visitors to the neighborhood. While the city
had proposed an alternative parking structure, there was cer-
tainly no guarantee that it would be implemented and thus, to
manifest their disapproval of the project, opponents refused
to move their cars from Mulberry Street when it had to be
closed to traffic.
Far from directly involving the community, the Mall project
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was an imposition by the city on the neighborhood because
most of the decisions were made by the Urban Design Group
even if many neighborhood residents had argued for a greater
role in the design and implementation of the project. The
Mall, which after all was an attempt to institutionalize
what residents had been spontaneously accomplishing through
their festes and celebrations for decades, was such a failure
that it has been extremely difficult to renew interest in
this strategy for revitalizaing Little Italy.
If the Mall reflects conflicts within the Italian com-
munity and between this community and the city, the housing
programs setbacks reflect unresolved conflicts between the
Italian and Chinese communities. While, on the one hand,
housing construction on certain sites in Little Italy will
not be realized because further studies have subsequently
shown that projects designated for these sites are not econ-
omically feasible, conflicts between the Italians and Chinese
over land use and ownership have also halted projects. For
example, the Chinese community protested against the choice of
a Hester/Mott Streets site for a 120 units housing project,
arguing that part of the land was owned by the Chinese Budd-
hist Association and that in 1970 they had submitted a plan
for a construction of a Buddhist temple on the same site. Re-
presenting the Chinese community, Reverend Mew Fung issued a
statement strongly protesting against the City Planning Com-
mission and the Italian leaders, and indicated that the new
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housing plan was "an invasion of [their] rights of equal op-
portunity and prejudice towards [their]religion." 2 8
The controversy was eventually resolved on September 2,
1975 when Zuccotti announced that the housing project in
question would not be carried out because of the city's fin-
ancial crisis. After all, the plan was not recession proof!29
The Chinese-Americans would not get their Buddhist Temple
and the Italian-Americans would not get their "mediterranean
style" housing. And so, with two of the most important pro-
grams not realized, little remains of the ambitious "Risorgi-
mento" plan except a remembrance of promises, the many promis-
es made by Mayor Beame, Percy Sutton, John Zuccotti, Senator
Jacob Javits, and others.
The promises and the plan have remained at a standstill
but the promoters have moved ahead. Tarantini, executive
director of LIRA, has left Little Italy because the city did
not renew its contract with the LIRA, and has instead become
the directory of the Italy-America Action Council. Ramati,
director of the Urban Design Group, is trying to publish a
book on her "cosmetic design" (banners, etc.) for neighbor-
hood preservation. Last but not least, Zuccotti, a self-
designed "new-Jacobean" and often called a "street-wise ur-
banologist," has lived up to the image of "soft cop" or "ri-
sing star" in the political firmament: he is currently the
deputy mayor of New York City.
To talk about the gap between promises and what is ac-
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tually delivered, to determine what went wrong between in-
tentions and realizations, is to fall prey to the origin
myth, to assume or believe that in the beginning the ideas
were good and that they somehow became corrupted by their
contact with reality. It is my contention, however, that
at the root of the "Risorgimento" plan and of the planning
process conceived and adopted, was a clearly conceived but
cleverly concealed political design to manipulate community
participation and to exploit ethnic values. This is manifest-
ed in three interrelated aspects of the process: an occulta-
tion of or failure to deal with the real context; an emphasis
on business interests of middle-class hegemony; and a dis-
tortion of the concept of participation.
The real context of Little Italy was heterogeneous: eth-
nically, economically, and socially. The "Risorgimento" plan
was, in perspecitive and design, homogeneous. Given the pre-
sent multi-ethnic population of the neighborhood, it seems
absurd that the city would want to impose a homogeneous Ital-
ian-American ethnic flavor on the area, which if anything re-
flects a past reality. Absurd? No. Well conceived and de-
liberate. The ethnic flavor, as we shall see, was a business-
men's agreement.
The varied needs of the different ethnic groups, the re-
sulting conflicts among them were not dealt with locally. The
Italian, Chinese, and Spanish speaking residents did not meet
to discuss the problems confronting them or interact on matters
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directly concerning them. The maneuvering was done between
the city and the intermediaries (LIRA, etc.). The City Plan-
ning Commission, however, did not ignore the non-Italian pop-
ulation. After dealing with the Italian businessmen of LIRA,
it also made pacts with the Chinese businessmen.30 There
were afterall three miniplans.
While the miniplan supposedly represented an attempt to
"tailor" the planning process to the needs of particular
communities, it has proven to be a tool for dividing, oppos-
ing, and controlling these communities. It controls inter-
mediaries by making them compete for existing limited resour-
ces; it divides and opposes different ethnic groups so that
they do not form coalitions and become powerful. If people
had managed to transgress the original physical boundaries
separating the ethnic groups, the Planning Commission, through
the strategy of different miniplans, was once again establish-
inq those boundaries. No attempt was made to provide instead
a framework where people of different ethnic backgrounds could
co-exist harmoniously, where ethnic differences could be
accepted and cultivated, which is after all what the New Eth-
nicity is all about. Yet, for those who were actually "parti-
cipating in the "Risorqimento" planning process, ethnicity
implied something very different.
If the neighborhood was heterogeneous ethnically, it was
also heterogeneous economically and socially. The vision of
Little Italy as "a place of qreat food and spectacular fes-
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tivals" meant that one interest group -- restaurant and eth-
nic food store owners -- would benefit but that the economic
heterogeneity of the neighborhood was being overlooked and
that there would be severe consequences for it. An expan-
sion and development of restaurants and ethnic food stores
might mean attracting a chic and wealthy clientele to Little
Italy and bringing profit to the few owners, but it would
most probably mean (because of the pedestrianized Mall and
other "cosmetic design" changes) that the light manufactur-
ing industries would be forced to move elsewhere, that there
would be a tremendous loss of jobs for the community, and sub-
sequently that working-class residents would be displaced
(and we can already predict what will happen to the vacanted
apartments, etc. -- see So-Ho, Boston Waterfront). Thus, Lit-
tle Italy, in a transition to middle-class hegemony, would be
joining its neighbors (So-Ho, etc.).
The ethnic flavor was, after all, just that: ethnic flavor
-- a commercialization of ethnicity, an exploitation of ethnic
values for consumer purposes so that a select group of busi-
nessmen could profit at the expense of the community. This
exploitation or distortion of ethnic values was a clever dis-
guise for transforming the social reality of the neighborhood.
In the attempt to convert Little Italy into a city-wide and
regional tourist attraction, the neighborhood as "neighbor-
hood" was beina ianored. The planned "cosmetic design" changes
might improve the physical structure of Italy, but what
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about the social reality? Preserving the ethnic character of
Little Italy meant further commercializing and sterotyping
cultural expressions, giving a middle-class touch, the Mall,
to a social group which had been forced, in its struggle for
human and cultural survival, into marginality. What about
the neighborhood residents? What did the "Risorgimento" nlan
hold for them? Were their options limited to either being
displaced or further exploited in low-paying jobs as waiters,
etc.? Certainly the "Risorgimento" plan had made no provi-
sions, outside of an eventual additional service or two, for
them -- there would be no share in the profit which the re-
inforced ethnic flavor might bring. It was clear that the
profit would be going to a few businessmen who lived outside
the neighborhood.
This brings us to the intermediary, LIRA, and why it was
chosen by the city to represent the Italian-American community.
LIRA has on its board of directors mainly Italian-American bus-
inessmen, most of whom own property and fancy restaurants in
the neighborhood but live outside it, in Long Island, etc.
The power of LIRA comes from a large constituency, 1000 fami-
lies who once lived in the area and who have expressed an in-
terest to return to the neighborhood if the housing condi-
tions would be upgraded. Therefore, if Italian-American bus-
inessmen were advocating more housing development, etc, it
was not so much to help the elderly and working class Italian-
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Americans. Also to be questioned, is the committment of
those families to returning to Little Italy and whether they
really exist. (Incidentally, when I asked LIRA for a list
of the families, my request was denied.)
Members of the City Planning Commission have confessed
that they could not ignore the businessmen of LIRA who con-
trolled the community. The Commission hoped that by meeting
the requests of the businessmen and reinforcing economic de-
velopment, there would be a filtering down effect, that some-
how the community as a whole would benefit. Certainly the
City Planning Commission made no attempt to expand LIRA's con-
stituency to encompass those actually living in the neighbor-
hood who needed to be represented. And so, LIRA, the organi-
zation which had originally been set up for surfacing the
community's needs, instead ended up dealing with its own; which
was to represent the community, instead monopolized the com-
mercial development of the community.
The planning process finally adopted by the City Planning
Commission certainly had little to do with tailoring a plan
around the needs of a community as a whole (it revolved around
the needs of one group of businessmen) and with neighborhood
preservation. The city's new planning approach which conceived
comprehensive planning as a process and implied a shift from
master planning to community planning does not much alter the
existing power structure. This structure has merely become more
complex and its consequent political compromises are only more
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articulated. In a conference speech on decentralization,
Zuccotti stated: "Public participation is what democracy is
all about -- and I think we all recognize that communities have
a right to be consulted about their own future."34 The contro-
versiality of this statement is, intmy opinion, in the answer
to the question: How should communities be consulted?"
Should they be consulted through intermediaries, such as LIRA,
who only represent and serve special interests of the commun-
ity or through a more complex, lengthy and difficult partici-
patory process which directly involves the neighborhood resi-
dents in an attempt to articulate and satisfy their needs and
interests and raise their consciousness and ability to trans-
form their neighborhood reality?
Referring back to Zuccotti's statement: "[...]the only
choice is to work with the communities -- or they will work
against us[...]," in the light of the "Risorgimento" experience
such a statement implies that communities must be dealt with
because they represent a potential threat. All subsequent
action is thus a means for controlling, removinq that threat.
Intermediaries were co-opted to eliminate that threat -- their
business interests merged with the city's (for example, the
city's interest in the neighborhood as a regional tourist
attraction and in the stimulation of the real estate market
which would result in an increase in tax revenue) and they
could be counted on for controlling the communities. Thus, the
city did not care (or cared very much!) that LIRA only repre-
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sented a vertex of the Italian-Amercian community, that devel-
opment was only seen in economic and not human terms.
Instead of a community participatory process, a benevo-
lent dictatorship appeared -- a plan was imposed on the commun-
ity and no alternatives were even considered. A struggle which
should have been between the community and the city, was in-
stead between intermediaries (who had little or nothing to do
with the communities) and the city. The city could easily
control the intermediaries by their divide and rule tactics:
separate miniplans, limited resources which would have to be
competed for.
To control the community, the intermediary (LIRA) has
employed a particular strategy -- it intensified a fear and
mistrust for the outsider: both the other ethnics (especially
the Chinese) and the city officials and planners. From my own
experience in the community, it was clear that the Italian-
American residents felt threatened by the infiltration of oth-
er ethnics into the neighborhood but that this threat had been
intensified by the LIRA. This xenophobia had been created to
serve the intermediary's interests. In order to impose a
homogeneous Italian ethnic flavor, a need for reinforced Ital-
ianita had to be felt by the Italian-American residents. They
had to feel threatened. The intermediaries also heightened
the residents' bitterness towards and distrust of city offici-
als and planners, in order to be backed by the community in
bargaining with the city. Their control of the community could
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therefore serve as leverage for getting their personal inter-
ests satisfied.
The major problem in this planning experience, as is often
the case with experiments of community participation, lies in
the inability or unwillingness of officials and planners to
first surface the residents' needs and interests, and then
to develop a process by which these often.contrasting and con-
flicting needs and interests are synthesized in a common devel-
opment strategy. I see no alternative in terms of significant
citizen involvement and development of communities unless first
of all intermediaries (in the way they are conceived and oper-
ate today) are eliminated and there is a new form of community
leadership. And if we wish to speak about participation in
terms of social equality and decentralization of power, this
will require a different framework or context, certainly not
a capitalist one.
The radical transformation of such a socio-economic frame-
work certainly does not lie within the immediate future and
therefore more modest proposals and alternatives have to be
offered. The preservation and development of Little Italy could
have given better results had the city agencies and officials
had the necessary political will to involve all the ethnic
groups living in the area and develop proposals which served
the interests of the community at large and not just parti-
cular groups. The failure of the pedestrianization plan,
the setback suffered by the housing program, and the current
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shortage of funds for community development because of New
York's fiscal crisis and the lagging economy in general, should
encourage the city and the community leaders to review the
glamorous Risorgimento Plan and take a more modest but effec-
tive outlook on the implementation of the programs indicated
in that plan.
While I agree that the programs included in the plan are
necessary and in the long run would be of benefit to the com-
munity, I suggest, in the light of the above, that the focus
now be placed on other programs such as housing rehabilitation
and job development, and that neighborhood development strate-
gies and priorities be reworked with a larger constituency.
The following are suggestions32 for new actions and possible al-
ternative development strategies which could be proposed by
city officials:
1. HDA should refinance LIRA but request that the
community development organization be restruc-
tured to include representatives from the Chi-
nese, Puerto Rican, and Dominican population.
These other ethnic communities must be given
a stake in the development of the neighborhood.
2. The City Planning Commission and restructured
LIRA should develop strategies to better publi-
cize other less emphasized programs in the
community and, with the residents, work out
the phasing and modalities of the implementation
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of these programs (rehabilitation, services,
job development, etc.).
3. Services should be planned and implemented si-
moultaneously with the housing rehabilitation
program. A detailed analysis of population
characteristics (beyond census).and needs is
necessary. It is also important to assess the
level of service and mutual aid which local
ethnic organizations still provide to residents
and potentiate those that could better reach and
serve the poorest and most isolated residents.
4. Rehabilitation techniques and financing mech-
anisms should be worked out to guarantee that
the renewal of physical structures does not sub-
stantially increase rent levels for the residents
and does not lead to their displacement. Rent
subsidies, such as those available under the CDA
(Community Development Act), should be publicized
in the community. Low interest loans to small
landlords (Article VIII of the Private Housing
Finance Law of NYC) should also be publicized.
Landlords should be solicited to eliminate code
violations on their properties and, if they do
not comply, the city should confiscate their pro-
perties (Section 507 of the General Municipal Law,
NYC) and subsequently set up tenant cooperatives.
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The city and LIRA should also provide all the
necessary technical legal assistance to residents.
5. Given the present conditions of the physical
structures and the-population distribution'of the
neighborhood, it is advisable that the rehabili-
tation and renewal efforts be concentrated on
the northern part of the neighborhood where
ethnic influence is weaker but where most of
the poor and elderly live, more vacancies pre-
vail, the neighborhood is less cohesive, and
where real estate speculation is most probable.
6. In order to maintain the economic heterogeneity
of the neighborhood (which is definitely one of
its assets), the city and LIRA should give equal
consideration to the industrial (manufacturing)
and commercial bases of the neighborhood. It is
therefore important that the city initiate a
program to attract new business activities on
the eastern edge of So-Ho adjacent to Little
Italy, where there are presently many vacancies.
At the same time, LIRA should develop training
programs for the residents and offer incentives
to encourage the development of small scale semi-
industrial/artisan enterprises managed and owned
by the residents in the neighborhood.
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CHAPTER SIX
-SYNTHESIS OF PROBLEMS AND ISSUES
"We live someplace.
The question is whether politics should
also live there."
(D. Morris & K. Hess, Neighborhood Power)
"While all development is transformation,
not all transformation is development."
(Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed)
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The revival of ethnicity and the preservation and develop-
ment of ethnic neighborhoods are key issues today. In order
to speculate on their present state and on the future direc-
tions they could take, it has first been necessary to under-
stand their past. Since the ethnic neighborhood is not an
independent and isolated entity and its evolution is greatly
due to a complex dialectical relationship between it and Amer-
ican society in general, we have attempted to understand both
its history and the evolution of ethnic groups and ethnicity
in relation to American society and its dominant ideologies.
We have analyzed the evolution of Italian-American neigh-
borhoods and have seen how initially (between 1880-1920) they
were ethnically heterogenous colonies of immigrant workers
(reservoirs of cheap labor), cultural "shock absorbers" to
ease the transition betweeen the abandoned homeland and the
new society. With time, these colonies generally became
monoethnic enclaves and in the second phase (between the two
world wars) were insulated, highly structured, fairly inde-
pendent microcosms. The neighborhood was a "cultural retreat"
for those unwilling or unable to assimilate in the American
mainstream, a "purgatory" for those hoping and waiting to be
eventually assimilated. After World War II, the ethnic neigh-
borhood became a transition area characterized by a deterior-
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ation of its physical structures and a breakdown of ethnic
institutions, neighborhood order and cohesiveness.
The ethnic neighborhood has historically been an antithe-
sis to the mainstream of American society: it has been either
a symbol of the refusal or inability of certain ethnics to
assimilate or has represented a temporary stop before assim-
ilation. In a society which emphasized individual assimila-
tion and social mobility, the ethnic neighborhood has remained
the home of those who stayed behind, those who usually did
not assimilate and rise in socio-economic status. It has
stood for stability, roots, cultural heritage, a sense of
history, community ties; characteristics in opposition to the
dominant ideology of individual assimilation and social mo-
bility. Social mobility implied negating one's identity (ethnic
background) and leaving one's ethnic neighborhood and has
thus always threatened and undermined neighborhood stability.
The last few years represent a renewal of interest in and
a reconsideration of ethnicity and ethnic neighborhoods,
both of which have been on the verge of disappearing. There
have been and there continue to be attempts to preserve and
develop certain inner city ethnic neighborhoods but, as we
have seen, these attempts too often reflect the following
failures and dilemmas:
1. Commercialization of ethnic values and cul-
tural expression.
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2. Profit-oriented approach mainly serving special
interest groups or attributing too much power
to businessmen. An overemphasis on business
interests; the belief that if community busi-
ness is sound, the neighborhood is sound.
3. Failure to deal with the community as a whole,
to represent and deal with the interests and
concerns of the majority of the residents.
4. Perpetuation of a hierarchical neighborhood
socio-economic structure and coopted, exploitive,
community leadership.
5. Failure to effectively involve underrepresented
and voiceless neighborhood residents in a partici-
patory process leading to/implying the decen-
tralization of decision-making and planning pro-
cesses and a redistribution of power and control.
6. Lack of a guarantee that residents (particularly
the working class) presently living in a neigh-
borhood will not be displaced and replaced by the
well to do.
7. Inability to eradicate a dependence on and con-
trol by ourside forces (banks, investors, etc.)
which minimize the residents' ability to control
their neighborhood development.
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Our analyses, in this thesis, raise further problemitic
issues which I feel are central to a consideration today of
ethnicity and ethnic groups and which must be among the con-
cerns of future ethnic neighborhood preservation and devel-
opment attempts. These issues are: assimilation vs. cultural
pluralism; ethnic vs. class stratification; and manipulative
intermediaries vs. community leaders.
Assimilation vs. Cultural Pluralism
With the advocacy of cultural pluralism in the sixties,
there appears to be a rejection or modification of the ear-
lier American policy of assimilation. Challenged is the con-
cept or process of cultural assimilation considered a prere-
quisite for socio-economic assimilation; cultural assimilation
being used for the maintenance of a certain socio-economic
order. Socio-economic assimilation was a long, difficult se-
lective process. For example, the fact that only a few Ital-
ian-American names come to mind amongst those individuals able
to effectuate a role in the American power structure and deci-
sion-making processes indicates how limited and restrictive
the process of socio-economic assimilation has really been.
Those ethnics advocating cultural pluralism are generally
intellectuals who have already been assimilated into the Amer-
ican mainstream. They are questioning the fact that they,
their parents, etc. had to forfeit ethnic identity and cultur-
al traditions or practice and transmit those traditions in
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isolation, being open to possible ridicule and debasement by
others. They are questioning the price of social mobility
and success and realizing that in their desire and eagerness
to "make it," they cut themselves off from their roots too
fast. And they are discovering that not all are making it
and are finally learning how important those roots are.2
What must be noted is that these ethnics can presently ques-
tion the dominant ideology and the rules of society because
they have been assimilated and are now in a position of
strength.
They are attempting to resuscitate a lost identity and
understand their evolution as Italian-Americans, the conflicts
between their group and the host society, what had to be for-
feited by their group, what was nevertheless accomplished by
it. They are also asking to be really socio-economically in-
tegrated, that is, participate in transforming the social re-
ality, and no longer passively abide by its rules.
Cultural pluralism and transculturation should mean an
alternative to assimilation where cultural negation through
the imposition of values and norms is the price for social
acceptance. Obviously implied is cultural renewal or trans-
formation. What the new culture, which will result from the
merging or intersection of many different cultural traits and
expressions, will.be like is difficult to envision. What is
predictable, however, and of great importance is that a
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pluralistic culture will lead to a greater acceptance of
diversity and thus to less ridiculing and oppression. With
less obligation to homogenize, there will be more freedom
and more significant human liberation will be encouraged.
There will be more inventiveness and creativity. Cultural
pluralism should hopefully lead to ideological and political
pluralism, and a transformation of the infrastructure. 3
I sincerely doubt that such radical cultural transfor-
mation will occur and that the full implications of cultural
pluralism will be realized, particularly since the intentions
and concerns of ethnics do not reveal a desire to transform
the infrastructure. As we shall see under 'Ethnic vs. Class
Stratification,' ethnics appear content with the capitalist
economic framework and reveal a desire to "make it," be part
of the society it implies. The ethnics' views on cultural
pluralism and cultural renewal thus appear utopian and are
in direct contradiction with their socio-economic concerns.
These ethnics seem to neglect or lack a proper understanding
of the intricate relation between the infrastructure and
superstructure.
The forces of capitalism and the consequent society it
implies will also ascertain that cultural pluralism does not
reach its fullest implications, does not keep its revolution-
ary potential. The system has already accepted cultural
pluralism in order to employ divide and rule tactics. If
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assimilation helped to preserve a determined socio-economic
order, cultural pluralism, supposedly the antithesis of as-
similation, could be employed by the system in order to set
different ethnic groups against each other and make them
compete for existing limited resources.
An economic system oriented around profit and a society
around consumption can exploit cultural pluralism, negating
its characteristic of creativity, through comercialization.
We have only to consider how ethnicity has already been con-
verted into marketable products; food, ethnic sweaters and
jewelry, the ambiguous, multi-ethnic or racial doll whose
traits permit it to be a representative of any racial or eth-
nic American group.
Ethnic groups are presently at the stage of rediscovering,
and redefining their particular ethnic culture. There is
evidence of a return to the past, to the old values of family
and neighborhood, to certain ethnic institutions (such as the
church) in their quest for lost identity. This process is
(I hope) seen by the ethnics (and which I feel it can only be)
as a temporary, transitory one. Critics of the New Ethnicity
suspect that the above stance reflects a fear of approaching
death, a last attempt to prove that one is well -- now that
ethnic differences are disappearing, there is an attempt made
to preserve them. But unlike the threatened whooping crane
or American bison which have been placed on wildlife reser-
vations or in zoos, confined, segregated, protected and so
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preserved, ethnic culture should not be perpetuated in seq-
regation if it is to evolve and flourish. (And if segreqation
is necessary, it must only be temporarily until group con-
sciousness and strength is restored for further cultural and
social action). Nor can ethnic neighborhoods be zoos, as they
are becoming -- places for spectators to visit where cultural
pression is no longer free to be itself and to evolve in
its natural habitat (for example, festas as manifestations of
community cohesiveness) but is caged, unable to express itself
naturally and is subject to the gaze of curious spectators
(festas turned funfairs). If old values are being proposed,
they must reflect evolution, show that they have caught up
with the present. The advocacy, for example, of a return to
family and neighborhood can be a positive one if the concept
of family is redefined (an oppressive patriarchal family struc-
ture is certainly questionable) and the neighborhood as a
defensive cultural space can no longer exist in a society sup-
posedly embracing cultural pluralism.
Central to the issue of a cultural pluralism are the
questions: what changes will occur, what new forms will an
ethnic culture assume if it is transformed from a defensive,
alternative culture which has historically been emarginated
from the dominant one to one more fully incorporated into a
new dominant culture; and how will the individual ethnic cul-
tures change if cultural pluralism materializes and they merge
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to form a new culture? These questions must be faced by the
different ethnic groups and particularly by those advocating
the preservation and development of ethnic neighborhoods.
If neighborhood residents become the primary actors in
the preservation and development of their ethnic neighborhoods,
some of the issues they will have to face are the following:
Which ethnic cultural traits and cultural expressions should
they attempt to preserve and develop, which traits that their
group had to forfeit should they resuscitate? Should certain
ethnic neighborhood institutions be preserved, can they assume
new roles and functions? How can the commercialization of
ethnic values be prevented; the conversion of ethnic cultural
expression into marketable products and thus its conversion
into a dead, fixed, defined, static object rather than a
viable, evolving process. Is commercialization of ethnic
values necessary in order for the dominant culture to incor-
porate them? Is the commercialization of ethnicity essential
to the neighborhood residents who make their living from sel-
ling fresh mozzarelle and freshly baked bread, serving cap-
puccini? Will ethnic neighborhoods further commercialize now
that ethnicity is popular and there is thus a good opportunity
for profit-making?
Ethnic culture has historically been defensive and emar-
ginated, a "culture of consolation"4 and resignation, and eth-
nic neighborhoods insulated, segregated, and emarginated places.
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If ethnic cultural expression finally has a chance to develop
and freely express itself, what will this mean for ethnic
neighborhoods; how will their role and function change? Will
ethnic neighborhoods reinforce their ethnic culture, if so
how, and will they still remain segregated, monoethnic places?
Will American society be composed of a variety of monoethnic
neighborhoods? Will they instead be multi-ethnic? Can an
ethnically heterogenous population nevertheless impose a
dominant ethnic flavor as has been the case for Little Italy
in New York? Will such a situation inevitably perpetuate an
oppressive environment since one group dominates over others,
as has historically been the case for multiethnic colonies?
Or will neighborhoods be truly culturally pluralistic -- com-
posed of a variety of cultural differences and cultural ex-
pressions where all are acceptable and accepted?
Or will a common ethnic heritage be reinforced and serve
to initially organize ethnic communities so that they can ac-
tively participate in the preservation and development of
their own neighborhoods? Will the emphasis on ethnic cul-
ture then be superceded by other concerns and issues? After
all, the ethnic neighborhood not only represents the home of
those who share a common cultural heritage, but also of
those who have been socio-eocnomically emarginated. Therefore
cultural and ethnic issues must be dealt with coextensively
with class and economic ones.
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Ethnic vs. Class Stratification
It can be argued that an emphasis on ethnic distinctions
or ethnic differentiation has been employed and may continue
to be employed for the maintenance of a hierarchical capital-
ist system with its socio-economic stratifications and inequal-
ities, and to obfuscate class struggles and prevent class
consciousness.
We have seen how most immigrants who came to America in
the 1880's came defined a priori: they had been requested as
cheap labor. Their cultural traits were for the most part
due to their economic origin but they, for example the Ital-
ians, who had been debased on class terms in Italy because
they were peasants, were now debased in America on ethnic or
racial terms because they were Italians. When the ruling class
and or nativists sought to criticize or put down immigrants,
they did so on ethnic grounds, at times even employing "sci-
entific" theories (to convert an ideological or bigoted stance
into a supposedly objective one) such as eugenics and social
darwinism. This enabled them to argue, for example, that
Southern and Eastern Eruopean immigrants belonged to an in-
ferior race and to justify the Americna capitalist system:
if the immigrants were biologically inferior, it was to be
expected that they were given menial and degrading jobs and
remained poor. Kinder Americans encouraged Americanization
or assimilation to help civilize and make these immigrants
eventually become like them! Obviously the elite could not
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condemn the immigrants on class terms, that is, say that they
were offensive and objectionable because they were cheap
labor and oppressed: that would mean acknowledging the op-
pressive capitalist system.
Thus, very often ethnics came to view their dilemma as
being the result of what they were told was an inferior na-
tionality, and saw assimilation as the only alternative to
their situation if they were to transcend mere survival. It
was usually difficult to define themselves in terms of their
roles in production and work in the economic system, and thus
organize themselves around class issues.
Ethnics did succeed in organizing and radicalizing as
workers in the 1910's and 1920's, thereby going beyond their
economic segmentation and establishing multiethnic coalitions
and achieving class consciousness and solidarity. The means
used by the ruling class to destroy such a potential revolu-
tionary threat aimed at re-emphasizing the ethnic and re-
establishing ethnic segmentation: Sacco and Vanzetti trial,
deportation, restrictive immigration laws. Because of such
oppressive tactics geared around ethnic discrimination and
segmentation, it has been difficult to maintain strong work-
ing class movements in America.5
Ethnic differentiation and segmentation has also led to
socio-econoimc stratification as a result of the processes
of assimilation and ethnic succession. If assimilation was
used by the ruling class to eliminate cultural differences
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and ethnicity, it nevertheless ended up emphasizing ethnic
groups because of hierarchies created by an uneven assimila-
tion rate. Also responsible for the creation of hierarchies
among the different groups was ethnic succession; America had
successive arrivals of immigrant groups and the last arrived
was usually the (temporarily) oppressed group. The American
realities of social mobility (as justification for a class
society and as an invitation to all to make it) and of an
immigrant nation with ethnic succession and ethnic fragmen-
taion have been. in my opinion, key devices for preventing
class consciousness, potential revolutionary class movements
and socialism in this country.
Ethnic succession and segmentation resulted in the fol-
lowing simplified pyramid where the different ethnic groups
occupy horizontal strata located on a vertical socio-economic
line:
rich WASP
Ethnic group A
Ethnic group B
Ethnic group C
Ethnic group D
Ethnic group E ...
poor Blacks
This form of stratification has begun to break down because
of a decrease in immigration and because individuals have moved
from the stratum occupied by their ethnic group on the pyramid
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to higher ones. The present upward mobility of ethnics as
well as the concerns of advocates of the New Ethnicity indi-
cate that cultural pluralism, supposedly the antithesis of
assimilation, could result in the perpetuation of socio-econ-
omic strata and hierarchies. In my opinion, it appears that
the horizontal pyramid is being/will be replaced by another
one which now contains within it smaller pyramids (vertical
stratification), each smaller pyramid having its own hori-
zontal strata which are socio-economically determined.
A Ethnic elites
F E2 F E E5F1 E2 E 3 E4 E5
Each ethnic group will thus have its own pyramid, comprised
of an elite and lower socio-economic classes. It is probable
that the elite of the various ethnic groups will be struggling
for a greater share of economic opportunity and more power.
The majority of ethnics do not appear to be concerned with
the realities of the capitalist infrastructure and the resul-
ting inequalities it produces. By stating that they hope that
more members of their ethnic group will make it, ethnics are
accepting the capitalist system and therefore inevitably accep-
ting the hierarchies and inequalities implied or they reveal
an ignorance of the functioning of the American economic sys-
189
tem.
In order to continue functioning, the capitalist system
will most probably oblige the ethnic elites and ethnic qroups
to compete for existing limited resources. As an alternative
to this, the ethnic groups could first reinforce their pyr-
amids and then form coalitions to bid for resources and to
effect social change. If they do not, it remains likely that
conflicts will develop among the various groups, that they
will be pinned against each other. If there is no further
significant immigration and if multiethnic coalitions among
members of the lower socio-economic strata of the various
groups do not materialize, there will also be conflicts with-
in the ethnic groups, either among those belonging to the
lower strata or between them and the group's elite. The forms
that the conflicts will take as well as the relationship be-
tween the elite and lower socio-economic classes is not clear
and will greatly depend on many factors such as the role and
responsibilities of the elite and ethnic leaders towards their
ethnic consittuency or group; how will they control their
group or meet their needs, will they perpetuate an old hier-
archical order under new ethnic names or introduce social
change?
It was stated earlier, under"assimilation and cultural
pluralism," that many advocates of the New Ethnicity envision
a society of cultural pluralism and transculturation where
different cultural traits and different ethnic groups coexist
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harmoniously Doesn't this imply that all will be equal?
Yet between this envisioned cultural utopia and ethnics'
socio-economic concerns which sugge3t the perpetuation of
inequalities, there seem to be apparent contradictions or a
a hiatus. There appears to be an improper understanding or
failure to dialectically associate issues relating to
infrastructure and superstructure which could lead to such
contradictory visions. The new ethnics avoid taking a
Marxist perspective in their analyses. They want to rein-
force ethnicity and their ethnic group, hoping that such a
reinforcement will solve their problems; they want to elim-
inate cultural oppression but do not realize that cultural
oppression is greatly a result of economic oppression. In-
stead of struggling for the elimination of the root of op-
pression, they accept it and naively believe that an en-
forcement of their group in the political arena will elim-
inate oppression. Inevitably oppression will undergo "slip-
page," will be transferred elsewhere because it forms an
integral part of capitalism.
Concerns regarding the cultural preservation and de-
velopment of ethnic neighborhoods must lead to and not dis-
guise more important socio-economic concerns. The ethnic
neighborhood, after all, has represented and represents a
poor, physically decaying inner city district where many
working class ethnics continue to live. Ethnic neighbor-
hood development should not lead to the displacement of such
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people if they desire to live in the neighborhood. Preser-
vation attempts should not conserve the marginal status of
these residents for even if the ethnic neighborhood has dis-
played cohesiveness, there have been and continue to be op-
pressive hierarchies in the neighborhood which represent
class stratification. Obvious issues and areas of conflict
are why and how the neighborhood residents will want to deal
with such a socio-economic neighborhood structure. This
issue directly involves the intermediaries or neighborhood
leaders who historically have acted more out of selfish in-
terest than in the name of the majority of the residents.
Neighborhood development must imply not only an improve-
ment of its physical structures, but since physical develop-
ment cannot be separated from social development, it should
mean that neighborhood residents who presently feel power-
less must regain control over the events of their daily
lives, must control their living environment. It is they,
not outside forces, who must determine the future and fate
of their neighborhood's development rather than be the vic-
times of further impositions and exploitation. Effectively
involving these people in participatory processes which
allow them to decide on and plan the preservation and de-
velopment of their neighborhood is a first step toward
erasing a deep long-instilled feeling of powerlessness. One
of the major ingredients and catalysts for bringing about
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such a possibility of community organizing and participation
is appropriate community leadership.
Manipulative Intermediaries vs Community Leaders
In the complex dialectic between ethnic groups and
neighborhoods on the one hand and American society on the
other, there has been a recurrent and historically constant
agent -- the intermediary. There have essentially been two
types of intermediaries involved in the dialectic between
the ethnic neighborhood and American society: those who
have come from the neighborhood (padroni, prominenti, crime
bosses, politicians, the Church, businessmen, etc.) and
those who have come from the mainstream of American society
(settlement house representatives, Protestant missions,
planners, city officials, etc.). These intermediaries have
either been in favor of or against the assimilation of the
ethnic community in the neighborhood.
Those intermediaries coming from the neighborhood who
opposed the assimilation of the community, reinforced the
ethnicity, marginality and insulation of the neighborhood using
it as a means for their own socio-economic advancement and
upward mobility. Their advancement certainly did not imply
the advancement of the neighborhood community. They pro-
vided services for the residents and on the one hand worked
against the system by attempting to prevent it from provid-
ing services and assimilating the residents so that they
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could control the community and profit from this control.
On the other hand, they worked for the system by providing
cheap labor, etc., and were also co-opted by the system be-
cause in their attempt at individual advancement they were
playing the game dictated by the dominant ideology.
The intermediaries reinforced the feelings of powerless-
ness of the residents by making the residents dependent on
them. These feelings of dependence and powerlessness led to
the residents' acceptance of a neighborhood hierarchical
organization and belief that they needed to be represented
by others. They thus depended on the practice of interces-
sion for having their needs met. This invariably led to
manipulation and exploitation. Intermediaries and interces-
sion stifled conflict between the neighborhood community and
American society.
Direct conflicts between the neighborhood and American
society -- with no compromising intermediaries -- could have
provided better responses to the residents' needs and per-
haps have led to substantial changes in the neighborhood.
Such conflicts could only occur if the residents acquired
group cohesion and strength, but it was certainly not in
the intermediaries' interests (with the possible exception
of the Church) to help erase the residents' dependence and
powerlessness.
A new form of leadership is needed if neighborhood com-
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munities are to become organized and agents of social change.
Community leaders may come from the neighborhod, from with-
in the larger ethnic group community, or from the outside
(planners, etc.). It is essential, however, that they are
not motivated by selfish interests, a desire for advancement
or power, do not represent special interest groups, or be-
come co-opted by the system. They must serve and work with
the majority of the neighborhood residents who have been
underrepresented and voiceless. If the leaders come from
the oppressor group, they must rid themselves of all oppres-
sive ideologies and join the oppressed in an act of solidar-
ity. The leaders must also help the oppressed exorcise the
oppressor within themselves (fatalism, resignation, fear of
freedom and social change which oppressive ideologies have
instilled in them), and work together in a common dialogical
process of de-ideologizing.6 *The people must find them-
selves in the emerging leaders, and the latter must find
themselves in the people." 7
The relationship between the leaders and the people
cannot be a triangular one with the leaders occupying the
vertex of the triangle, but must be a horizontal one with
leaders and people forming one body in contradiction to the
oppressor.8 "[...]leaders cannot think without the people,
nor for the people, but only with the people." 9 Leaders
can no longer be the primary actors and thereby create the
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danger of a new dependence or mediation, but must have trust
in the people's potential abilities and capacities and help
them become the primary agents, give them back a feeling of
power through active participation, make them the ones who
bargain and struggle as a group.
Nor must the leaders come as saviours to the people,
bringing with them their pre-determined and professionalized
view and analysis of the neighborhood situation, and impos-
ing their view on the residents. It is together with the re-
sidents that leaders must analyze the neighborhood reality
and unfold and understand the history of the neighborhood and
its group; instill in the residents an awareness of their
socio-economic marginality; help them to discover and arti-
culate their needs and interests; make them aware of all the
different forces which work for and against them, of all the
complex obstacles against social change in our society; con-
vince them that they can regain control of their living en-
vironment and improve their social condition, that they are
capable of defending their interests in the political arena;
and implement a common development strategy composed of a
participatory process through which powerlessness is eradi-
cated and former victims, spectators of the social reality
imposed on them, become agents for transforming their
reality. The ethnic neighborhood must no longer be a re-
fuge for the penalized, emarginated and oppressed but must
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become a space for social change and human development.
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Notes
1. The state of ethnic neighborhoods in inner cities de-
pends on the specific context and on the particular
ethnic groups living there. Therefore, any generalized
conclusions will require studies similar to the one I
have done for Italian-Americans. However, current liter-
ature on the subject and the fact that the New Ethnicity
values are shared by most ethnic groups seem to indicate
that any conclusions I have made with respect to ethnic
groups and neighborhoods in general are justified.
2. Geno Baroni quoted in Anne Allen, "The Powerhouse Priest,"
I-AM, 1, November 1976, p. 46.
3. I am employing the terms "infrastructure" and "superstruc-
ture" in their Marxist connotation.
4. The expression is Elio Vittorini's.
5. Even the movements of white ethnic workers in the six-
ties, as we have seen, originated around economic and
class issues and subsequently resulted in a reinforce-
ment of ethnic fragmentation and segmentation.
6. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: The
Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 163, 174.
7. Ibid., p. 162.
8. Ibid., p. 164.
9. Ibid., p. 126.
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